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THE SOUL OF RECIPROCITY PART ONE: RECIPROCITY REFUSED

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1. From the Soul to the Subject

Intersubjectivity poses itself both as a problem and as a solution only within the regime of representation that has prevailed since Descartes—although it was foreshadowed by post-Scotist scholasticism.

Effectively, with Descartes, the soul died, and the subject was born. In his "Second Meditation", Descartes denied that any human being can be absolutely certain that he is a "rational animal", or of having a soul, in the sense of something "tenuous" which "permeates" the body. Although he concluded here that self-movement and sensation were "foreign to the nature of a body" identified with extension, he also declared that he was unsure that his mind really moved things or sensed things, or inspired nutrition. Instead, he could be certain only of the consciousness of thinking. In this way the conjoining of thought with the originating of movement (including the specifically animal motions of sensation, nutrition and growth) which traditionally composed *psyche* or *anima*, was abandoned.

This abandonment occurred, not only because thought was now seen, epistemologically speaking, as standing on its own in graspable certainty, but also because, on the basis of this epistemology, a new ontology of selfhood was erected. Our essence was now that of a "thinking being"—a subject, or bare grammatical "I"—and no longer an informing *anima*. This essence was declared to be "really distinct" from the body, merely on the basis of its thinkability without the body—so the real distinction was in a sense generated on the basis of a Scotist formal distinction, which hovers between

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the conceptual and the actual. It is certainly true that, the more Descartes proclaimed the reality of a good God, then the more *anima* tended remarkably to return within his thought, in terms of a mysterious sphere of interaction between mind and body which must be acknowledged, since the mind does not detachedly observe what happens to a body—as a captain might observe his ship—but is really affected by it. Yet this secondary theological ontology which qualifies what Jean-Luc Marion so well describes as the *ontologie grise* generated by *mathesis* and formal distinction, cannot entirely restore psychic substance to the new ethereal subject. Even within its terms, the mind only knows the material world as one of pure extension, drained of intrinsic eidetic significance or teleology. It "represents" this external world in terms of "common notions" or "ideas", which are now for the first time de-ontologised "thoughts", deriving their formality from the mind alone (which knows extension "eminently" as mathematical ideality), and no longer from the *eide* or real essences which indwell material realities and then migrate from this mode of substantiality to cognitive expression of their fuller truth.[1]

One might suppose that to invoke the soul is to conjure up ontological dualism and psychic solipsism, yet it is clear from the above account that the very reverse is the case. It is rather the modern subject, and not the soul, that is related to an inherent dualism, which result from the Cartesian attempt to arrive at a stable compromise between a spiritless world, on the one hand, and the priority of spirit, on the other (an all too seductive dream that was already diagnosed and resisted by Henry More and Ralph Cudworth in seventeenth-century Cambridge, even if later Cudworth's daughter Damaris and her friend John Locke, lamentably succumbed.) For this compromise, the sundering of initiated motion from cognitive manifestation was crucial, as we have just seen. By contrast, *psyche* had been the site of their intersection. Whether or not a world-soul or panpsychism were explicitly espoused, the idea of *anima* was in some continuity with the notion of animation in general, as spontaneous force in matter, irreducible to mechanical causation. Likewise it was in some continuity with the notion that there are *formae* or *eide*, inherently meaningful coherencies out there in the world and constituting all things. Thus for Aristotle and Aquinas, the human soul was primarily the meta-form and principle of motion of the human animal body, while in its exercise of one specific intellectual power of abstraction of forms it was capable of initiating rationally willed motions also. Precisely as soul, the human being was not closed within its own interior space, but radically opened outwards in the very heart of its interiority to become "in a manner all things." Nor was it set over against the body. First of all it was the body's form (the form of all its forms, given that a body is for Aristotle that which has organs). Secondly, for both Aristotle and in his wake Aquinas, the operation of the senses on the surface of the body as all in some sense "touch", proves that the body exists only as the mediation between soul and informed matter, permitting that metaphysical distance through which alone those

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realities which of their nature manifest, can, indeed be manifested. (It is this conception of the body that was renewed by Merleau-Ponty, who thereby implicitly opened the way to a restoration of both *psyche* and *eide*).[2] Nor was neoplatonism in its Proclean branch, nor Augustinianism, any less committed to the non-dualistic, mediating conception of *anima*. For both these currents, the human soul, while time prevails, is within time and subject to change and mutation. If, for Augustine, the immortality of the soul is proved by its contemplation of eternal objects (for example geometric realities) which fully exist only within the soul, these objects nonetheless constitute in some measure also the physical world—which would not exist and would not be construable without, for example, points and surfaces. For Augustine, following here the Stoics, the geometric point is itself the power to generate a line, while the soul is compared to a point or number possessed of force.[3] In Augustine also, from *De Musica* onwards, memory is a primarily ontological reality, such that things first of all exist within "time-spans" not "space-spans", meaning that they exist as self-recording.[4] Finally, for all these traditional construals of *anima*, interobjective events themselves involved something approaching the subjective "reading" of one reality by another, since form responded to form according to an objective order of affinity, hierarchy and aesthetic *convenientia* (to use Aquinas's term), which nevertheless did not necessarily preclude the emergence of radically new conjunctures.[5]

It is clear then, that under the regime of "soul", what we today tend to think of as objective and subjective were thoroughly confused. Radical spontaneities, mimetic recording of self and others, inherent meaning (underwritten by the eternal), existed "out there" in the world of objects and were not just the property of subjects. Inversely, the conscious, free, all-representing soul was still primarily inserted within the world of time and motion. *Psyche* was primarily an event or series of events, one might say. And nothing could be further from the truth than the common notion that modernity is primarily the loss of a radical passivity, with a concomitant modern overstress on human construction. To the contrary, Descartes, with his "counter-renaissance" reaction (which feared that even Aristotelian *eide* were too vitalist, too hermetic, too pagan, too magical), substitutes for the soul as event a subject (*res cogitans*) which no longer initiates corporeal motion, and no longer fulfils corporeal form. This empty, contentless "thinking thing" is correlated with an initially passive stare at the world of extended objects, which are given to it unequivocally, even if it methodically, and so automatically, "produces" these objects in their eminent algebraic purity. Only on the basis of this unequivocal giving from a spatialised domain, echoed in the unselected or preferred fatality of method, is the subject then paradoxically able to exercise a power of pure Promethean *techné* now indifferent (unlike an earlier Renaissance Augustinian *poesis*) to ends underwritten by transcendence. And as subject of passions as well as representations, the Cartesian subject is no less a passive slave, since what it thinks it feels, in fact subserves mere survival.[6]

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Because soul is event, because it mediates reason and the body, representation and motion, it is also the case that contemporary attempts within analytic philosophy to "explain consciousness" reductively, entirely miss the point concerning the relation of the notion of soul to the experience of consciousness.[7] Assuming that the soul in something like a Cartesian ethereal inner observer within and behind the brain, they suppose that correlation of observable brain processes with reported phenomenological awareness, explains away the psychic. In fact even this attempted correlation has long since proved impossible beyond a certain point, and the materialists are driven to mystical talk of "emergent properties" and the like.[8] But even were it possible, nothing of course allows a bridge to be constructed between the discourse of empirical observation of the measurable and the phenomenological discourse of what is apparent to awareness. This does not indicate the pure privacy of the latter (as attacked by Wittgenstein); rather the point is that all human life and understanding presupposes the manifestness of things, such that we cannot make sense of the idea of a being that cannot show itself (as already set out in Plato's *Sophist*).[9] By contrast, we can, indeed, imagine all brain functions being performed unconsciously by a race of zombies (apart, perhaps, from the non-functional exercise of prudential and poetic judgement)—rendering any functional account of consciousness *a priori* impossible. What we cannot imagine, since it is meaningless, is a world of things altogether outside the way they appear to us: certainly the notion of the zombie does not really make sense, but only in the same way that thinking of a world altogether outside the way it makes itself known to us makes no sense.

Hence it is not that mind simply beams a light upon things; for while it does illuminate, it is only able to do so because it meets an answering beam coming from things themselves. If we are conscious and aware of being conscious, then we cannot separate this power from the power of things to come to consciousness. Consciousness, then, like *psyche*, is prior to the subjective/objective division, and is an ontological, before it is a psychological or epistemological matter. I should not say that, after sleep, my consciousness awakes, rather I should say "I awake to consciousness". And, indeed, we do talk like that. (Even though, of course, certain physical conditions inside me have to be fulfilled before I can come to consciousness). "External" things as well as minds contribute to consciousness, and bodies mediate this double source. Consciousness is therefore always presupposed and cannot be explained, any more than we might hope to explain primal manifestness, which is convertible with primary being. Where mind is supposedly reduced to brain, then, if one is not satisfied with the scientifically nonsensical "emergent property" (the ghost of lost *eide*, the substantive forms which non-scepticism cannot really dispense with), then the phenomenological must be regarded as the epiphenomenal illusion of appearance somehow entertained by zombies —and things have got more remarkably mystical still.[10] (Not that such

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mysticism can be "disproved"). Ironically, though, the reduction of mind to observable objectivity remains with just what it imagines it dismisses: namely a Cartesian or Kantian theoretical subjectivity transcendentally removed in its gaze from the scene of activity. If it is observable that the mind is brain, then this is supremely and clearly manifest … and to what? Clearly to nothing that could itself be observed, else we have entered a vicious regress.

From the above remarks, I hope that two points start to become apparent. First of all, that where the regime of *anima* prevails, there is no problem of intersubjectivity, and nor does intersubjectivity offer itself as a reserved sphere of Kantian practical reason, I/Thou encounter, inter-monadic phenomenology or whatever.[11] Instead, "intersubjectivity" (It is the wrong term really, but I will still use it), simply rides on the back of interobjectivity, although it intensifies the latter to an extraordinary degree. And because of this riding, the interaction of souls is always reciprocal and always involves the concrete exchange of concrete specificities—since a body may only affect another body in opening itself to return effect and in establishing a wider, shared embodiment. Psychic interaction is therefore neither a one-way respect for the other, nor mere mutual respect for freedom—although these tend to be the limited options for intersubjectivity in the wake of Descartes and Kant.

The second emerging point is that the real issue is soul versus subject. In order to reject the subject (of representation), we would have to recover the soul—or no doubt rework it in a postmodern fashion which stressed even more its links to time, event, embodiment and language (mere recuperation would not be enough). This recovery would in itself provide us with the full richness of reciprocity, beyond the thinned-out intersubjectivities on offer today. Compared with this issue, the current debates are mere shadow-boxing. For it turns out that postmodern opposition to the subject, ethical intersubjectivity and subjectivism without individualism, all in actual fact remain with the modern, representing—and individualist—subject.

2. *The Subject of Immanence and the Subject of Epistemology*

Briefly, I want to indicate why this is so, in each of these three cases. First of all, "postmodern" opposition to the subject. Ever since Spinoza, some writers have put an alternative spin upon the univocity of being, by stressing immanence before subjectivity. That is to say, they have not focused primarily upon the reduction of ontology to epistemology which univocity of being opens up as a possibility. (This opening appears because a finite being, which is replete in its existence as finite, can be equated with what we know of its being.) Instead, the "Spinozists" have focused upon the totality of all finite being as the site of a repleteness of self-existence, and therefore self-comprehensibility, that has been "captured" from transcendence. Thereby,

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of course, ontotheology has not been at all abandoned, since this totality of "world" is merely what remains once the existence of an idolized, ontic God standing in relation to the world within a shared univocity of being has been denied.

Thus Spinoza transfers Descartes's ontotheological *causa sui* from the transcendent to his immanent God, with the result that the old double and aporetic constitution of metaphysics is thereby preserved: the one substance is alone fully and properly cause, and yet causality can only be defined in terms of the finite operation of an efficient cause which precedes and so in some sense pre-contains its effects, just as for Spinoza its logical principle precedes and precontains its consequence.[12] In Spinoza and his heirs (including the German idealists), the aporia of ontotheology's double constitution is intensified in terms of the one substance's self-causing occurring immediately as the various causings effected by its various modes; while inversely, these causings are "really", for the highest perspective, the one self-causing of substance. This circular and fractal double emptiness traces precisely the path of metaphysics into nihilism, as Jacobi already realised.[13] Nihilism ensues, because no real transcendent source has ever been entertained, only a "self-causing" which fractures the required simplicity of the source, such that it is conceived of as before itself and as repeating the finite requirement for a ground, as if it were merely the "first" finite thing.[14] Likewise, it has been assumed that the world has a "boundary", instead of asking whether the world is an open sequence of events which are contained in all their existence in a source that is not "other" to the world itself.[15]

Nevertheless, the post-Spinozan perspective partially restores the soul, by placing the subject back within the flux of events: events as logical are already somewhat "psychic", while the soul knows only by actively rearranging reality. Yet the immanentist construal of univocity is not really free of the epistemological one. The idea that it could be, it seems to me, is a primary illusion of Gilles Deleuze's contemporary Spinozism.[16] For if the confinement of being to immanence and temporal flux clearly appears, then one must assume that it appears to a reserved meta-subject, not caught up within the flux after all. The emptiness and lack of fixed substantive identity of this postmodern subject, is actually none other than the emptiness *et cetera* of the Cartesian subject. It is still one and the same frozen, spatialised subjectivity, immanently rapt out of time. And inversely, the various shifting identities taken on by subjects caught back up inside the flux of events are evanescent, since they do not participate in eternal, true identities within the Logos of God. Since these subjects are only subjects of change, in so far as they remain subjects they are also, after all, just like the observing meta-subject, emptily self-identical (substantive without qualities) and punctiliar modern subjects. Only when they dissolve altogether into flux, do they lose this characteristic; but then this supposed pure dissolution into objective flux must be observable by the privileged

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meta-subject. In consequence, the supposed postmodern dissolution of the subject is in fact a shuttle between two modern subjectivities locked in irresolvable ontological conflict.

3. *The Refusal of Reciprocity*

The second contemporary attempt to escape the Cartesian subject is ethical intersubjectivism, which has many exponents, but is now most associated with the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Ever since Kant, at least, the problem has arisen of how to conceive of ethical knowledge which concerns the intersubjective, if knowledge is fundamentally possessed by a single subject representing to himself objects in so far as they appear to him according to the (perhaps transcendentally objective) canons of his subjective awareness. This problem is, indeed, only one aspect of the emergent modern problem of communication and understanding between subjects. However, the extreme variant of this problem which is the possibility of solipsism, is perhaps not one very seriously entertained; no one ever really thought they were alone in a world of objects and zombies. To the contrary, the reduction of one's own essential interiority to an empty receptacle meant that one readily supposed one knew by projection the essential interiorities of all other subjects. If anything is a problem here, then it is more to do with the basis for the continuity of the individual subject in time and of the collaboration of essentially unco-ordinated individuals across space. In either case, various occasionalist, semi-occasionalist, pre-establishmentarian and immanently providential ("hidden hand") solutions were resorted to. In this sense, God, who primarily upheld the individual psychic essence, had to be again invoked, as idolised ontic intervener (not as genuine creative cause of *esse*) to explain the appearances of the intersubjective.

The case of the ethical was, however, a little different. Here, after Kant, one could avoid treating oneself and others as known objects, if one isolated another sort of intersubjective reason which was a kind of direct angelic knowledge possessed by one spiritual *noumenon* of itself and of others, even though this knowledge had to be materially mediated by objects, in a way that finally undoes Kant's conception.[17] The Kantian vision has today been radicalised by Levinas. For Levinas, the address of the other to self first arouses self, ensuring that ethics, not theory, is the fundamental horizon for all subjectivity, knowing and therefore being (given the continued pull of a transcendental phenomenology).

However, Cartesian dualism is so rigorously preserved by Levinas, albeit in altered form, that any visibility of the other, any spatial characterisability, and therefore any characterisability as such, renders the other supposedly no longer other and no longer subjective.[18] In that case, as both Ricoeur and Derrida in very different ways suggest, the purity of the other in its non-appearing must after all be accorded the characteristics of free subjectivity

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and suffering undergone from our own private inner experience which we project outwards.[19] Levinas cannot at all accommodate the Wittgensteinian lesson that even experienced pain is inseparable from sign and gesture, since for Levinas appearing betrays the pure beyond-being of the subjective other. Certainly, one can accept that first of all I am a "you" addressed by another "I", with the consequence that first of all one is an object to oneself and only later does one internalise the "I", which then of course includes the entire project of imitation and adaptation of the character of the other. But this scheme assumes that intersubjectivity is embedded in the appearing and grammatically "said" (not just the "saying", as for Levinas) world of inter-objectivity.

Levinas fears that if the other appears characterisably in "the said", then this is already an other introduced to my presence, who reciprocally depends, for the constitution of his subjectivity, on his attention to my visage and objectivisable utterances. Such a Buberian mutual constitution through dialogue, Levinas repudiates as subtle narcissism, since if there is mutual dependence without asymmetry, there is in reality only mutual reflection and mutual re-assurance, whose origin must really lie in either one of the subjective poles, which then revert to self-constituting egos. However, Levinas never really considers (unlike Merleau-Ponty, as we shall see), whether reciprocity could be itself asymmetrical. And his own alternative has the same upshot as Buber's admittedly over-formalist dialogism.

For if I am instigated by the other, and not the other by me, then there is a surplus in the other (and by implication in me for another "I" to whom I in turn am an other) which is self-constituted. In his essay on Buber, Levinas explicitly affirmed this consequence, and even equated it with the starting point of all philosophy. Although this is a relatively early essay (1958), the conclusion seems a valid implication even of his later position.[20]

Levinas in fact produces a bizarre inverted egoism, which conserves a mode of Cartesian dualism, and indeed perhaps accentuates it into a mode of manicheanism. Although it is now the other I and not I myself which is the foundation for understanding, a gulf is fixed upon its basis between the *Il y a* of empty meaningless existence that cannot be redeemed, and which always engenders horror (symbolised by the unwanted consciousness of insomnia) on the one hand, and the ethical cosmos which establishes "the right" of the subject in the face of this horror, on the other. On the ethical plane, the result is a reactive ethics which falsely identifies self-obliteration with the final good, and requires the good to be predatory upon pre-existing suffering. Against this conception of the ethical, Paul Ricoeur has rightly advocated the reciprocity of Aristotelian friendship, in which ideally giving is met with counter-gift.[21] However, there are some grounds for wondering whether Ricoeur has the full measure of the pre-modern sense of reciprocity and does not confuse it with the Kantian categorical imperative.

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First of all, he seems to think that intersubjectivity depends upon a projection of an alter ego, even if this is balanced by an equally co-originary experience of the other. But this would be refuted by a consideration of how we internalise the "I", as indicated above. And it is clear that while we sometimes imagine what it would be like to be inside the other, most of the time we construe their psychic reality perfectly well by experiencing their external words and free spontaneities which reveal their singular and unique judgement, from their spatially and temporally unique perspectives, just as if real people were characters in a book.

Secondly, Ricoeur explicitly says that reciprocity is summed up in the golden rule, and that the latter is re-formulated by Kant.[22] However, reciprocal friendship in the Middle Ages involved much more than this. Agreement in the good, upon which friendship was based, did not mean merely respect for the dignity of each other's freedom. Instead it meant an orientation to a finally unknown, transcendent good, that was nonetheless ceaselessly and newly mediated through concrete historical circumstances.

Hence friends shared specific concrete goods in the context of a society seeking to orientate itself towards justice, and therefore recommending specific roles and specific virtues for its members. Friends were characteristically bound together as kin or quasi-kin in terms of local affinities and relatively circumscribed tasks.[23] In Thomas Aquinas, for example, one will find—shockingly, perhaps to us—not a word which construes charity as the neutral altruistic love for the remote, but much about a hierarchical, preferential exercise of charity according to specific relations and affinities—of course including that towards the arriving stranger.[24] For Aquinas, we are to exercise charity as finite animals, and anything else would be hubris: but there is no indifference to the remote or alien involved here, since within the *ecclesia* the remote for us is close to the warmth of charity for others, and all are close to God. Therefore, mediaeval charity excluded not at all eros and preference and affinity, and even extended this thinking to its conception of the divine-human relation. In this way its sense of reciprocity was linked to the contingency of events and a binding exchange of specific things: this rather than that. Ricoeur, I sense, does not grasp this, and instead endorses Kant as capturing the essence of the reciprocal. However, I shall argue below that in Kant the rejection of a "thick" sense of reciprocity as I have just described, is actually central to his entire pre- and post-critical projects. By contrast, his intersubjective ethics reduces to respect for freedom which we must acknowledge in the other simply in order to be consistent with our own free and rational self-identity. In promoting freedom, or the formal self-sustaining of freedom, as the supreme value, Kant actually elevates value above finality of purpose: that is to say, above actual ontological realisation according to nature. This value above the actual and the directed is indeterminate possibility, or absolute freedom, which, therefore, when actualised, can only appear as the unreciprocal willed assertion.

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4. Is Reciprocity Ontotheological?

My appeal here to a Mediaeval sense of the priority of the reciprocal might, however, be taken as an appeal to a merely metaphysical or ontotheological sense of the ethical, which confines it within an economy of contract, of measurable give and take. Here, it seems, the impulse of charity is obliterated, since a gift which expects a counter-gift merely looks towards maintaining a pre-given equilibrium between ontic states. This is explicitly the opinion of Jean-Luc Marion in his brilliant and astounding book *Étant Donnée*: reciprocity is inevitably ontotheological and charity concerns a one-way gift utterly indifferent to any return.[25]

However, such an opinion is surely residually—or even emphatically—Cartesian. For the one-way gift is, as it were, the degree zero of intersubjectivity, and the nearest one can get to construing ethics in solipsistic terms. Thus in Marion's work, the difficult task of conceiving a pure gift as the transcendental essence of giving (even though its actual practice may, for Marion, always involve exchange), overlaps with the task of carrying out a phenomenological reduction to the absolutely and ineluctably given, that arrives altogether without precedent or presupposition.[26] For Marion, this reduced given cannot even be, as for Husserl, a fundamental intuition of appearance, for two reasons. First of all, the possibility of intuition itself is entirely granted by the event of the self-giving of the phenomenon, which *is* in the mode in which it gives itself: gift is therefore prior to intuition. Secondly, the most fundamental phenomena, the most typical, archetypal, phenomenal phenomena, are saturated phenomena, of which a key example for Marion is the Kantian sublime.[27] Here the utterly unprecedented event cannot be seen like an object, because it is hyper-visible, and blinding to our intellectual sight, even though it frames our grasp of more abstracted and habitual appearances.

This invisibility resulting from hypervisibility of the most fundamental phenomena to which we are led by reduction, is correlated by Marion with the unilateral gift. Starting from the pole of the recipient of a gift, the giver of the gift must be reduced or bracketed out, because if he is named, then one will have some minimal sense that the giver was obligated to one (even merely as fellow human), or else that he can be compensated for his giving, if only by the return gesture of gratitude. In this way the gratuity of the gift is supposedly lost.[28]

In this scheme, the reduction of the giver has been carried out by the subject as recipient. He can also reduce the gift itself, since any residue of objectivity in the gift will turn the gift into something that can be used and possessed, thereby supposedly again compromising its gift-character. However, if one attempts the phenomenological reduction from the pole of subject as giver, the recipient must be himself reduced, since the truly free donor may gain no return satisfaction from imagining any specific grateful

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donee. This is said by Marion very much in the spirit of Kierkegaard's contention that love for the dead is a purer sort of love.[29] But clearly, as Marion notes, multiple aporias now arise, for it seems that the giver and the recipient cannot both be bracketed at once (even if both can bracket the gift); that the reduction is always made by a subject who can be himself reduced; that nothing will decide the priority as between the giving and the receiving subject.

Marion, however, decides upon the priority of the receiving subject.[30] He does so upon basically Levinasian lines: the knowing, constituting self comes phenomenologically later than the addressed, called, interlocuted self. As Marion rightly says, the real self always has a content which at first is handed over to it, with the consequence that we should speak, not of a "subject", but of an adonné, of a recipient that is co-given along with the gift. But how is such a subject to escape being merely the co-subject of an unreduced contractual economy from the point of view of the subject as donor? Marion here tries to speak of a gratitude, of a recognition of the hyper-presence of the gift, that will escape such an economy, and hence Derridean scepticism about the possibility of a unilateral gift ever attaining to presence. Yet it is difficult to understand how, once the real gift is identified with the unilateral gift, according to Marion's and Derrida's shared standards (however much Marion seeks to obfuscate this agreement), any notion of recognition and gratitude (which has "to be", and therefore is not protected by the impossibility of the gift merely "in being"), does not amount to return. This holds, even where, as is the case with divine Creation, the return is itself given by the giver (in the case of creation, as the grace by which we suspire). For still the gift as such involves return in some sense.

For Marion, however, the aneconomic character of the donee's gratitude is sufficiently guaranteed by the donor's anonymity. Yet this guarantee also fails, since the mere gesture of gratitude searches for the unknown other and therefore, already in receiving the gift, imagines for itself a reciprocity. Moreover, the absolute contentlessness of the gift is only provided by the saturated phenomenon, which as more than visible is sublimely invisible. Such a priority of donation over appearance means, as Marion finally concludes, that before elaborating a phenomenology, the recipient must, by a pure act of will, affirm the reality of donation.[31]

This conclusion is surely replete with ironies: total exclusion of active interpretation and poetic construction from original understanding, now rebounds as a pure voluntarism sundered from intellection; absolute insistence that the subject is passively interlocuted by the other in a way that precedes his active judgement as to the other's identity, now rebounds as a will that is purely the possession of the ego. Indeed, this rebound shows that the illusory pursuit of phenomenological reduction must conclude by displacing phenomenology itself as foundational.

These rebounds suggest that the original privileging of the receiving over the giving subject was an arbitrary one. In reality, there is no way to exercise

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a preference, since if, indeed, all knowing is a matter of seeing (as one "sees" principles, conclusions and plausibilities), then it is equally a matter, first, of construction; secondly of speculation, and thirdly, of mood or feeling.

It is construction, not in the sense of an interior operation of a supposed *a priori* apparatus upon sensory information, but rather in the sense of the exterior operation which mind and body together perform upon the world. If, as Marion himself claims, the radical passivity of phenomenology is not a mere metaphysical passivity set over against activity, then such radical passivity must be a mode of active reception, whereby to receive is also already to respond and to counter-influence.[32] For where passivity is so radical as to presuppose no receiving base whatsoever, as in the case of the interlocution that gives birth to subjectivity, then, paradoxically, the first moment of reception can be nothing other than the communication of activity. The model here is more like neoplatonic emanation than Platonic activity of a demiurge upon material chaos. Before the reception there is no preceding reality, but instead the act of donation itself separates itself from itself, and so "gives birth"—a process in which what is born must not be passive if it is to emerge from the womb at all.

Yet it is unclear whether Marion really thinks active reception. For if he did, then he would have to accord co-originality to the giving (the active, the shaping), along with the receiving subject. In the most originally conceivable process of reception, there is a reciprocal counter-activity involved on the part of the recipient. This means that if the recipient intuitively "sees" something, then this is through and not before or despite his own active contribution. All intellectual intuition must therefore be like the vision which the artist obscurely conjures up through the very activity of simultaneously receiving and re-moulding reality.

In the second place, to know is to speculate. Ever since Husserl, phenomenology has stressed that we only ever see aspects of a phenomenon—as when we can never see all sides of a cube at once—and that we see these aspects in a succession of temporal moments.[33] However, this is not simply a matter of seeing so far and no further: to the contrary, we only see the sides of the cube *as* sides of a cube, through an obscure inference of the hidden sides. To see a visible item at all, we must also in some way see in it what is invisible, if we are to see it as an item and establish its bounds. To speak here, as Husserl does, of a "horizon" of disclosure, in the sense that to isolate a phenomenon is to know that there is always more of it to be revealed, is accurate, but insufficient: if the phenomenon is to be apparent at all, then in some way the future disclosures along the horizon must be anticipated ahead of themselves. In this way, the inevitable and fractally gnawing absences of space can only be healed by the more benign absences of time, where the limit of the present moment is itself only constituted by retention of the absent past and protention of the absent future. Husserl, unlike Plato (in his delineation of the "*Meno* problematic", whereby in order to come to

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know I must in some fashion already have known), does not distinctly allow this truth of anticipation of the invisible in the sense of a pre-knowledge of the actual, and not a mere projection of possibility. This is unsurprising, because it is problematic for phenomenology as such. If the invisible must be seen in order for the visible to be seen, then fundamental intuition is always contaminated by a certain element of conjecture which constructs imaginatively what does not appear, in order that there may be bounds to what does appear. Conjecture, one might say—or else judgement or interpretation. Yet this conjecture, intellectual faith assumes, is not arbitrary. Therefore, it does indeed still "see"—but only, as it were, through the telescope of interpretation. But we have a single word for this double reality, and the word is "speculation"; to speculate is at once to see, and riskily to exceed vision. In economic parlance that is all it is. But in theological parlance, the exceeding of vision is, and is alone, prior to the *eschaton*, vision. Now we see *per speculum in aenigmate*. The hermeneutic telescope is also a mirror which shows, because it shows indirectly and obscurely. It is constructed to show beyond its own appearing surface; constructed to reflect. Speculation is also reflection, and when we reflect we detach ourselves, judge, hypothesise and ponder, yet through all this we envision.

Invisibility is not seen by conjecture simply in the mode of Marion's saturated phenomenon. In the latter instance, the invisible is negatively apparent as a blinding *éblouissement* utterly without anticipation, and within no natural or traditioned horizon whatsoever.[34] No surplus of conjecture over intuition is here required, because invisibility itself impinges as hyper-presence and the sublimely formless, which forbids all speculation. But in the case of the invisible that is seen in everyday phenomena, the invisible must be seen in order to let the surface visible item appear with any discreteness, and yet the invisible remains utterly retired. Here, then, speculation must make up for the lack, and provide the invisible with a certain provisional form.

In the third place, to know is to feel. Different states of minds, different moods, may indeed "colour" what we see, but they also disclose different aspects of what we see, just as they are in some measure instigated by these aspects. Even the most objective scientific understanding is disclosed to the mood of calm detachment, linked to the lust for mastery. Other truths are disclosed only to love of the ideal and desire for the Good. And here once again, it is true that (as for Plato) *eros* sees, but only in so far as its sublime preference evokes the very light of the Good by which all may be truly seen.

In this instance also, the ultimacy of vision proclaimed by phenomenology is retained, yet along with a co-primacy of mood (as of construction and speculation), which also ruins phenomenology *stricto sensu*. Where, as with Heidegger, phenomenology appears to allow this co-primacy, this turns out not to be the case, precisely at the point where the claim is made to provide an objective phenomenology of mood as such. Thus Heidegger thinks he

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can rescue mood from the subjectivity of theologians (Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard), and "reduce" mood to a merely immanent disclosure: hence *cura* (Augustine) is merely for Being in time and not time in relation to eternity; *ennui* (Pascal) is boredom with ontic being blind to the ontological horizon of death, and not an *accidie* that is unlivened by divine charity; *angst* (Kierkegaard) is the unhealable honesty of our ontological "guilt" before a Being we are always doomed to forget, and not the healable consequence of our fearful loss of a sense of the mediation of the infinite in the finite.[35] Heidegger imagines that his philosophical seizures of mood (*Stimmung*), confine attention to the moods themselves, removed from their conjectural (metaphysical or revealed) objects. However, mood is subjective; one cannot round objectively upon mood without claiming to "unmask" mood in the privileged mood of the cold objective stare. Since Heidegger does not intend to do this, what he really does is interpret these three moods according to the modalities of his own subjectivity and subjective vision. For an ontological care, boredom and anxiety are all experienced in relation to the totality of beings, and they must of necessity be inflected differently according to their mood-induced perception of what informs, or lies beyond that totality. Heidegger's own perception of a Being which is equally Nothing exhausting itself, revealing but inevitably betraying itself in the series of temporal instances, is itself mood-induced. For even if time is the horizon of Being as we known it, still the exhaustion of Being by time cannot possibly itself appear, nor the truth of simultaneous manifestation and concealment. All these things can only be interpretations—"seen" by the eye of a "religious" gaze. Heidegger's own reading of the ontological difference as presented by time (and one can acknowledge his epochal originality in showing how these two things are linked) is philosophically on a level with a reading of this difference in terms of the *analogia entis*, and time as the moving image of eternity.

Since Heidegger allowed, unlike Husserl, that construction, interpretative conjecture and mood inflect all intuition, he disallowed Husserlian reduction in most instances. Reduction, for Heidegger, only remains at the point where Dasein brings to light the play between Being and beings entirely within immanence.[36] However, at this ultimate juncture also, one must insist that if the invisible is said to appear, then its nature has been conjectured. The same point applies also to Marion's saturated phenomenon: that it is merely sublimely blinding rests upon interpretation and conjecture, and one which assumes the post-Burkean and Kantian division of the Sublime from the Beautiful. For another conjecture, which means also another mood of reception, the saturation of the phenomenon might yet elect a certain privileged and visible form or series of forms; as a matter of fact, Marion himself grasps that in the Christological instance the sublime "icon" is also a beautiful "idol"—failing to add however, that this is only within the "reading" of the Holy Spirit.[37]

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Since conjecture is ineliminable even at this highest level, it is not true that the Heideggerean reduction confines philosophy and human moods within their proper sphere of immanence. Instead, it merely elects a metaphysical immanence as the conjectured philosophical truth of fundamental human moods. By contrast, the positions of Plato (regarding *eros*), Augustine, Pascal and Kierkegaard, are "truer" in the sense of more internally consistent. For they remain with subjectivity in their highest visions and never seek, illogically, to round upon subjectivity, objectively.

Given, as we have seen, that construction, speculation and active feeling are as fundamental to subjective awareness as intellectual intuition (whose role is by no means denied), then there exists no ground upon which Marion should really elect the subjectivity of the recipient before the constructive subjectivity of the giver (constructive, since Emerson was right to say that the most authentic gift is something of one's own contrivance). But a co-primacy of these subjects returns us to chronic aporias. Reduction must be carried out by a subject in terms of what fundamentally and irreducibly appears. On this basis, the giver can bracket out the recipient from donation, and the recipient can bracket out the giver. But in that case, each in turn removes the subjective ground for reduction. All that would then remain of "phenomenology" would be a shuttle from illusion to illusion. Deconstruction would have resulted, and nihilism ensued.

And indeed, even though Marion has firmly elected the pole of the donee and its counter-bracketing of the donor as more fundamental, this election remains haunted by the original bracketing of the donee from the pole of the donor that he has earlier invoked. Marion's reduction, beyond Husserl's, is not simply to intuition of appearance, but to the "fold" which is the giving of appearance in the mode of its giving.[38] Thus, in the end, reduction is not to appearance, but to donation. The latter escapes the vision of the subject, and indeed before ever it can see, the subject is itself "co-given" along with the arriving appearance. But how, in that case, can one have reduction without a subject that reduces? Here, as I have already said, Marion has to have recourse to a purely willing subject that intervenes—differentially and deferringly—between donation and appearance.

For similar reasons Marion also adopts Michel Henry's account of how the body in agony, suffering and sadness, as likewise in desire, feeling and orgasm, "auto-affects" itself, without any ecstatic or relational reference to an external object. Auto-affection also counts for Marion as a "saturated phenomenon", and this instance of saturation does not precede the self-established Cartesian subject, but coincides with it.

For Henry is explicitly building upon the Cartesian solipsistic removal of sensations from body-cum-soul to the inner theatre of mind, even though, following Schopenhauer, he now corporealises this inner theatre to make self-referential immediacy the property of "life", and not of a non-extended essence other to life and materiality. Ryle and Rorty's correct objections to

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an inner theatre of representation are irrelevant to Henry's position, since he shares their attack upon an inward mirroring subject, who represents material sensations, but nonetheless re-proposes Cartesianism in terms of an isolated *cogito*, which affects itself before it intends itself, and always, under the *epoché*, primarily knows all "other" things as modulations of self-affection. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein's critique of the privacy of sensations is of relevance here, and it is highly significant that it was in part directed against Schopenhauer (one of the few philosophers with whom he was thoroughly familiar). In what ways are we affected that are completely disassociated from external and visible bodily actions, and from symbolic articulations that permit recognition and communication—even of ourselves, to ourselves? The answer is surely none. By ignoring this objection, Henry is able to re-Cartesianise Merleau-Ponty's observation that reflexive doubling is first found in the body which touches itself and moves itself prior to our conscious awareness or control. But in Merleau-Ponty this self-touching and self-moving is a folding-back upon itself of shared ontological flesh which belongs to the visible world in common, and not of the invisible life of the individual body. It is this folding of the external which renders the bodily self-relation a reflexive one, whereas in Henry an internal immediacy supposedly disallows any real reflexivity.[39]

Marion's insertion, in line with Henry, of a self-instigating will, along with other instances of auto-affection, ensures that there are now two steps that occur before one even arrives at phenomenology as such. First there is invisible donation; then there is the equally invisible willing of reception and thereby recognition of the gift; only then, in the third place, is there appearance, phenomenality. Marion has been forced, in effect, to concede the gap between the invisible and the visible which calls for conjecture. But since his still Husserlian perspective (unlike that of Merleau-Ponty) allows for no "aesthetic", "analogical" or "proportionate" mediation between the invisible and the visible (only for the oscillation between exclusion of the invisible by the visible, and blinding saturation of the visible by the invisible), the gap must be made up by pure self-manifestation and self-initiation. Thus whereas I am arguing for a conjecturing that also sees, Marion's fundamental willing does not see at all, but blindly asserts, with the blindness of a one-way self-sacrificial charity construed as the ultimate gesture. And such "charity" is surely more assertion than true gift, since it is charity to no-one. By contrast, there can only be a gift to *someone*, if only an imagined someone, else the gesture of giving, even the originating gesture of gratitude, is indiscriminate and inattentive to an other's reality and needs, such that its outgoing might equally well be the outgoing of poison or destruction. But a gift to someone is a gift to someone already in some sense apparent, someone to whom one is already connected. Therefore, even if (as theology certainly believes, but cannot be apodeictically shown) there is only, in the reality of being, relation and reciprocity where there is gift, it is equally true that there cannot be gift

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except when there is already relation and reciprocity. (Divine Creation is the exception that proves the rule, because here what is given to Creation is only the relation to God, by which relation alone Creation is in being at all.) If the first clause holds, then this also means that there can only be gift where there is already gift.

As unseeing, therefore, the *adonné* cannot be charitable. But it is also hard to understand how this willing subject can really be the subject of a reduction, since nothing appears to it, and until it wills by its act of reception for the gift to be, the gift is not made present. If, alternatively, the interlocuted *adonné*, as already self-affected prior to that self-affection which is will, constitutes the basis for reduction, then one is equally at a loss, since this subject belongs within the content of reduction: it also has originally arrived. Even if it has arrived to itself, this allows it no ground upon which it could claim to carry out a bracketing. For if the subject arrives as much as all the phenomena it sees, then there is no longer any immanent as distinct from any transcendent space. On what possible ground could one now deny that reduced phenomena were any other than the real transcendent phenomena of the world? What would now forbid a truly realist dimension? And yet Marion still claims to be observing the rituals of the *epoché*, in such a way that if "the Other" has priority over my own subjectivity, yet this priority still resides primarily in the immanent space of transcendental understanding. Perhaps the point here is that even within transcendental solipsism, the Other first reigns. However, solipsism surely triumphs in this situation over the Other, since the consequence of the *epoché* is that I cannot really interact with him. The Other gives me, and then I blindly receive him, or even worse, will that he exists. We never meet, or interact: indeed, for Marion's austere theology, this is the very guarantee of a pre-ontological primary charity.

But none of this makes very much sense. For if there is no real subject to carry out a bracketing, then the Other must be assumed to be a real empirical other, to whom I am connected in space and time, and whom I can only receive, precisely where I reciprocate. Heidegger, in fact, already more or less conceded this, since, unlike Marion, he allowed that intentionality transgresses the boundary between immanence and transcendence, and so between idealism and realism.[40] In the case of Levinas, things are not so clear, and yet the reduction to an original ethically calling Other who is within me as before me, suggests a transcendental call, immune to interpretation, and therefore as occurring within an immanent space rather than in real interactions. (But here Marion is the more rigorous thinker, and so more clearly reveals the problems).

One should add, moreover, that even in Husserl, the *epoché* is contradictory, since a doubtful suspension logically rests, as with Descartes, upon the superiority of the truth of the *cogito* to all other truths that the mind may entertain. Where, as with Husserl, the phenomenal contents of the mind are

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cognitively on a level with the *cogito* (something only arrived at by Descartes through invocation of God), then it is already hard to understand what brings phenomena within the space of reasoning, rather than reasoning within a real, external, ontological space of phenomena. No doubt this was hidden from view for Husserl because, instead of seeing that "intentions" (as for Augustine and Aquinas) are the very thoughts or "mental signs" which point beyond themselves, so ensuring the externalisation of mind as such, he tended to think of intention, after Brentano, as a kind of constructive/receptive beam shone upon concepts (even where he distinguished the intentional sense involved in *noesis* from the phenomenon intended, or *noema*) by an empty Cartesian subject.[41]

It seems, then, that there is no reason to suppose that the prior Other is not the real empirical other. But this observation, of course, takes us clean outside a pure, foundational phenomenology. We would then have to speak of a primary ontology of relation—a category which Marion tends to resist as "metaphysical". However, relation need not be taken to be either accidental or substantial, nor as atemporally fixed and irreversible, but can instead be taken to characterise the event, which brings about new and provisional intersections and constitutions, whose essential being hovers between the accidental and the substantial.[42]

If "relation" is not necessarily 'metaphysical' in a pejorative sense, then neither is reciprocal exchange. Marion only assumes that it is, either or both because he is thinking in terms of a Hegelian return to identity, and of a merely symmetrical and contractual exchange, reducible to egotistic benefit. Yet there can be return that is ever-renewed and therefore does not cancel the outgoing, as for the Christian Trinity. Likewise there can be exchange that is asymmetrical, and though it is in some sense obligated, leaves forever open the time and mode in which a return may be made. Certainly, both these models imply a unilateral moment—that something is always apparently "lost" and surrendered, never to return. For this reason, despite all I have said, Marion is always exactly half right. And yet, if the "gift" in its transit is always transmuting in order to stay the same fresh and original gift, the moments of loss are more to be seen as the continued becoming of the same gift (like passing and crossing notes in a piece of contrapuntal music).

The reduction of reciprocity to contract is, in fact, correlated in modern times with the emergence of the supposed pure, free, unilateral gift in the private sphere. Is mediaeval reciprocity of gift-giving (both in social practice and in theological theory) to be seen as metaphysical, and the modern free gift as post-metaphysical? But Marion and other French historians of philosophy of his generation have, above all, shown us that metaphysics in the sense of ontotheology has a modern inception, remotely with Duns Scotus, and more proximately with Francisco Suarez. The suspicion must therefore lurk that, with regard to reciprocity, the situation is really the other way round. Indeed, Marion's own final dualism of receptivity and will itself

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seems to echo a Cartesian sundering of passive intellection from willed assertion, which depends upon the idea that the will has of itself an infinite capacity for "indifference". By contrast, in earlier classical and mediaeval tradition, there was no surplus of the will over true desire for the good, and therefore no innate indifference; hence a wrong choice was also an absence of willing *per se*. It is true that Descartes by no means altogether departs from this tradition, since in the "Fourth Meditation" he still speaks of will informed by intellect as "an inclination", and as privated when lacking in this inclination. However, he also allows to the will, remotely following Scotus and Ockham, a pure essence poised indifferently between affirmation and nullification. Hence culpable error, for Descartes, arises purely from the will, where it seeks to speculate beyond the bounds of the knowable (defined in terms of the criteria of *mathesis universalis*: clarity and distinctness). This stands in opposition to the main traditions up till Aquinas, for which culpable error was also a deficiency in the judgement itself, and conversely the reach of desire could not be apodeictically pronounced transgressive, since no firm "boundary" could ever distinguish between entirely certain and entirely uncertain knowledge. Instead, all knowledge possessed by finite creatures of the finite was inherently tentative and instilled by true desiring, since the finite could only faintly participate in final, infinite truth. Culpable error, therefore, for Thomas and his predecessors, was more consistently always a lack—whether in capacity, judgement or will—and never a pure "nullification" performed by a will considered outside evaluation in terms of degrees of being.[43] (The boundary established by *mathesis* in Descartes clearly foreshadows the Kantian "critical turn".)

Is not the ground of this sundering of a now merely passive intellection from a now merely active since indifferent will, itself ontotheological? For univocity of being, realised in the methodological project of *mathesis*, encourages in Descartes the idea that one may think of a bare *res extensa*, without beautiful form, nor intrinsic teleological goodness, nor intrinsic truth of imitation of the divine ideas, as adequately an instance of *ens*. Such a reality need but be barely observed, or else "eminently" resumed in unextended mind.[44] It does not require that its substantial form be realised according to its *telos* of intelligibility through the reciprocal response of the *intellectus agens* which "gives back" to the form it has received, its higher truth of luminous comprehension. For the latter vision, "intersubjective" understandings between human souls are then but more intense instances of this pattern: they too involve further realisations and manifestations of good, true and beautiful forms which are shared as gifts, and through this circulation offered in their entirety as gifts back to God.

The recovery of *eide* has in fact been already half-commenced by phenomenology. Husserl realised (with supreme insight) that natural science only regards the real under a specific set of intentions.[45] It brings to birth, thereby, certain formal aspects of reality, and is able to produce real effects

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by regarding the concrete world as if it were composed of abstractions and regularities not ordinarily visible. Yet, as Husserl also realised, it is never able to bridge the gap between abstraction and real appearance: between, say, colour thought of as the refraction of particles of light, and colour as experienced and expressed in symbolic codings by consciousness. In this way, the space of *formae* remains inviolable and irreducible. With Husserl, however, this space was confined, along with all intentional domains, including that of natural science, to the immanence of subjective constitution (albeit a peculiar passive constitution). But it has already been shown why this account of intentionality breaks down.

One must rather save the appearance of appearances themselves by allowing that real transcendent things (of this finite world) are composed of formal essences which are communicable with other things, embody relational negotiations with them, and can evolve into knowledge through abstraction and comparison. This happens, one can add, only in language: in this sense universal formal essences are indeed linguistic, but not in the nominalist sense which reduces them to mental association bound together by a name, since in that case the structures of language are, after all, only instrumental and not essential to thought, and one has fantasised "original" discrete intuitions prior to language and without form, which somehow are "represented" in mind. Without natively abstractable form that gives birth to thoughts, this position is confined to the irresolvable Lockean dilemma as to whether material modifications "enter" mind to be converted into ideas, or alternatively ideas in the mind mysteriously "mirror" these sensations; the attempted Reidian escape from the dilemma which makes mind "directly present" to external reality is equally obscure (though the Berkeleyan version of such a view, whereby external things are themselves *signa*, can be deployed to exorcise the idea that "matter" is even a negative "something", or is anything more than the finite concatenation of various distinguished forms).[46]

But where the inter-objective and the *eide* have been lost sight of, then it is impossible to construe the subject as first of all a *forma formarum*, or a more intense and complex instance of the spiritual reality of form that is apparent in all things, and then as having, amongst its powers, the capacity of intellect which is a capacity "in a manner", but in a real manner, to include and be all other forms whatsoever, including all other human souls. Instead, the subject must be thought of as an alien visitor to the extended earth, and one primarily known through introspection upon an imagined emptiness. This void is then filled up with an absoluteness of will, which when regarded non-teleologically, admits of no degrees: hence for Ockham and Descartes our will is equal in its infinite indifference to that of God's. But what can the non-egotistic good of a non-teleological will be? None other than simply its own negation, it's own laying itself down in abasement before a reason that it no longer essentially informs (this is Ockham's view), or else it's own

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willing of the egotistic good of another willing instead of its own. Here, therefore, we have the metaphysical (nominalist and voluntarist) source of the unilateral gift, in hypostasised will sundered from the narrative actuality of real embodied wills. For a post-Cartesian perspective, the ultimate good cannot reside in reciprocity, since there are no longer any absolute goals of form shared in common.

5. *Is the Gift the* Cogito?

The alignment of Cartesianism with non-reciprocity can, however, be demonstrated in a yet more precise fashion. Marion himself, in an incredibly subtle and complex way, identifies the *cogito* with the one-way *donum* in Descartes' own work.[47]

Here again, he is building upon Michel Henry's philosophy of auto-affection. Henry, as I have already mentioned, rightly argues that, in Descartes, thinking includes sensation, and, is, indeed, paradigmatically a passive sensing. Animals, for Descartes, as *automata* perceive, but they do not sense. Hence sensing belongs entirely to intellectual self-awareness. This might make it appear that sensing is already reflexive and intentional. However, both Henry and Marion argue, with great brilliance, that almost everyone, from Kant through Hegel to Heidegger, has misread the *cogito* as involving self-representation, and intention of the self as a thinking subject. Certainly, for Descartes, the thinking subject is the ground of representations, of sensations and of passions, and therefore is eventually ordered towards ecstatic referral (intrinsically so, if only within immanence, for Husserl, but for Descartes under an absolute suspension of all referral, only theologically lifted, but then valid also as referral to an exterior). However, in the Seventh Response, Descartes denies that thinking in its most original purity is a reflexive representation or intention of itself: to suppose that this is necessary for thinking is as mistaken as imagining that an architect must ponder upon his abilities in order to be able to design a building.

Therefore, Henry (and Marion in his wake) argue that the subjective ground of representing objects is not a self-representation. Were it so, then schizophrenia would ensue, and aporetic removal of self from self. In consequence of such a false assumption, Kant divides an empirically known self from an apperceived soul which must be regulatively presupposed, but cannot securely be presupposed as really existing: here Hume's dissolution of the subject into the flux of perceptions is not really answered. But according to Henry and Marion, the *cogito* properly understood does not run these risks. For what it really implies is thinking as "auto-affection". When I dream, even though there can be no real represented object, there is a "seeming" that is simply the immediacy of my thought, and not even my thought thinking itself. This "absolute immediacy", this capacity to experience oneself which is consciousness (utterly singular, utterly non-relational), is deemed

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to be the pre-condition for experiencing anything else outside ourselves. It is, for Descartes, what animals lack and humans possess.

Marion argues that, once one has grasped that *cogitare* is auto-affection, it becomes possible to integrate Descartes' ideas about thought and passions, and about theory and ethics. For, first of all, active willing is also auto-affective. Willing, as "indifferent", is irreal, and not intrinsically a willing of objects or of appointed ends, nor is it itself in any way an object. Although, in willing, we simultaneously perceive that we will, this is a perceiving through willing, not a perceiving of a represented and intended object. In the second place, while most passions arise from the action of the body upon the soul (mediated by animal spirits through the pineal gland), some passions arise from the soul itself. These are less passions than "emotions" (a term closely related to the "moving" of the soul by words, in rhetoric), exampled for instance in "intellectual joy", such as, says Descartes, in the *Passions de l'Ame* (147) when a man is secretly relieved that his wife is dead, though moved to passionate sadness through the senses by funereal mourning. More significantly, there is emotion deriving from the soul itself in the case of "esteem" for oneself, and "gratitude" as rooted in this esteem.

Self-esteem is a species of wonder: for Descartes the strongest of the passions (and surely related to the Longinian account of the sublime so current in seventeenth-century France—even before Boileau). We wonder at ourselves and esteem ourselves when we exercise arationally willed control over our passions, which ensures our survival and increase in sustainable strength. In this way we are already generous towards ourselves, and this in turn is the foundation for our generosity towards others, and that in two ways. First of all, if we esteem ourselves for our own good-will, then we esteem that which absolutely cannot be taken away from us, and are in consequence free from envy and rancour. Secondly, if we recognise even the mere capacity for self-control through exercise of will as existing in other people, then we respect them for it, and are tolerant of their sense-induced or irrational failings. (Already, here, *in nuce*, we have a Nietzschean gift founded in non-ressentiment—a sense of generosity, which is fine so far as it goes.) We are generous also concerning their involuntary sufferings: however, pity here affects only our senses, not really the secure citadel of our will. Moreover, we pity less the actual sufferings themselves, than their lack of ability to transcend suffering by standing fast within their own citadels.

Upon the basis of this account in Descartes of esteem and generosity, Marion concludes that the *cogito*, as subject of feeling and willing as well as knowing, is also an immediate self-esteem and an immediate generosity. The *cogito*, therefore, is the *donum*.

However, the new restored Descartes is a yet more solipsistic Descartes. If the Cartesian subject is now shown to transcend representation, it also transcends intentionality (in the older scholastic sense) and all real relationality. Prior to the arising of representation, there occurs *cogitare* as pure

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immanence, a sheer passivity that is nonetheless only a sensing of oneself. Several criticisms can be offered of "auto-affection".

First of all, the notion arbitrarily makes consciousness pertain only to subjects, whereas I have already argued that, since the reality of the world also presupposes consciousness, we must regard consciousness as an ontological property. It is the result, not only of our awareness, but also of the capacity of things to come to our awareness. Once we admit, with Husserl, the *cogitatum* within the *cogito*, then there is no ground for bracketing this capacity.

Henry, nevertheless, escapes from the Cartesian mode of dualism, since he grounds the auto-affection that is consciousness in the auto-affection that is life. Through a bizarre and brilliant set of reversals, he upholds at once materiality and inwardness, by arguing that the reality of matter is the "in itself" of invisible energy, pulsion, feeling and action, not the external effect which this produces. Thus to watch the runner, is ideal and abstracted; it is to know nothing of what it is to run. Mere visible running is entirely ephemeral, and reducible to abstract forms and signs which have only indicative reality and are impotent to engender life.

Here Henry conjures up surprising allies: first Marx, who is seen as defending inner life in the mode of "use value". Henry argues that the entire economic sphere is imaginary and illusory, since it involves merely conventional and fictional equivalences and exchanges—yet this is the visible cultural world which we take for real. Since exchange—and therefore reciprocity—always involves such conventions, it is clear why for Henry there could never be an authentic gift that involved exchange; something of this seems also to hover in the background for Marion.

Secondly, there is the New Testament. Henry reads its books as already inaugurating a philosophy of life that is opposed to the Greek philosophy of phenomena. The Greeks assumed that what is to be known is what appears, and in the long run this was bound to generate the superficial turn to the subject which then says that all that can be known is what appears, or even that all that can be known is our apparent knowing, and nothing of things in themselves. The problem of a gap between reality and appearance was always latent for the Greek view. However, the profound turn to the subject that is imperfectly present in Descartes and evolves through Schopenhauer, Maine de Biran and *lebensphilosophie* to Henry, is implied by the New Testament itself. Although it does not link truth to phenomena, precisely this refusal is the result of its implicit grasp of a true phenomenology, which locates truth not in appearances but in a coming to appear, which is identical with itself and does not depart from itself. This coming to appear, or auto-donation, is life itself—it is things in themselves. However, when there is visibility, when there are phenomena to be seen, then this indicates that the purity of appearing which shows only itself to itself, invisibly (that is, non-representably), has been departed from. The "world" consists of these

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appearances which are indeed, as the West has so often suspected, misleading and ephemeral, conveying nothing of the real. This departure is itself (mysteriously?) "auto-generated" through the process of temporalisation. For Henry, the ontological is auto-affection, and the entire field of time—which for Heidegger was ontological in its ecstasy—is reduced to the ontic. Time contains no presence, which is the real work of *la vie*. Time only removes and destroys, such that the entirety of the visible—*le monde*—is really inhabited by death.

But Christ came to remove us from the world and to proclaim life. He is denied earthly, temporal parentage (!?) and insists in his teaching that our only true Father is God. His incarnation is the sublime saturated showing in the visible of the invisible—a shattering of visibility since visibility is death. We recognise Christ, not in his exterior *incognito*, but inwardly, when we know ourselves as sons of the Father, auto-affections given to ourselves by auto-revelation. Since it is only in this way that we can transcend ourselves—vertically and not horizontally—this recognition alone gives us the possibility of loving other people, through the sense that the excess within ourselves that is more than ourselves also grants other interiorities.

Yet it may well seem that the allies have been press-ganged. Less so, perhaps, Marx, for here one has to regret that Henry repeats the illusion of pure "use-value". The latter is always culturally determined, and so is valued in any way whatsoever, only via the exchange of signs. If these are phantasmal, then "life" as we can experience it, is only phantasmagoric. In the case of the New Testament, however, there is a forced manichean reading (which nonetheless is extraordinarily insightful). The "world" that Jesus opposes is really, against Henry, visibility divorced in the name of autonomous power (demonic and political) from invisibility. Likewise, the "life" which he brings, is a power of the invisible to illuminate the visible. Though he is *incognito*, this is not a disguise, but mystery shown by its very form to true desiring judgement. Otherwise he is disincarnate, and his blinding saturation which is light as such (and this cannot be denied) is not mediated in the specific narrative forms of his life, acts and teachings which this light illumines, and is therefore not revealed. The divine light can only be spoken of in the words of the gospel, yet Henry argues that, for the gospel, all human words, as impotent and differentiating, rather than life-bearing, are misleading and disclosive of nothing. It would follow that the entire discourse of the New Testament is one of unsaying, designed maieutically to instigate life in us. Only through this instigation can our wills then will that the saturated appearance of Christ it invokes is real—as with Marion's priority of will to appearing, described earlier. But then the historical reality of Christ seems superfluous, and the New Testament is reduced to philosophical *maieusis*. Supposedly, for Henry, it is more than this, because the word of Christ speaks phenomenologically only of Christ and not of something else. Yet if this word does not defer and differ, does not communicate,

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then it instigates in us, not an imitation of Christ as the truth, but only, maieutically, a recollection of our own lives as the truth. The mark of a life-giving word is surely not solipsistic self-reference, but rather a differing that also, unlike the human word, generates. But Christian doctrine says just this: the Father's Word as differentiated from himself is also his living Son.

If there is no duality of invisible and visible in the New Testament, then we may wonder also about Henry's rather nineteenth-century duality between the Greeks who admire the ideal visible, and the Hebrew legacy that exalts the material invisible. Perhaps, instead, both the Platonic Greek tradition and the Biblical tradition uphold mediation and participation: "God in whom we live, move and have our being". Being, which is manifest, is not here excepted, as deriving from the invisible and hyper-visible deity. As for the Greeks, it seems unfair to deny to them phenomenology. In the case of the Platonic *dynamis*, being is convertible with what shows itself. Yet this phenomenology is also a realist ontology: what there is to be shown is not exhausted in our seeing. Hence the gap is not one between appearance and reality, but rather between appearing and hyper-appearing—although every appearing in its self-giving also differentiates itself into appearing and appearance, or light and what light discloses. This gap nevertheless must be bridged in terms of the discursive, the dialectic—since the reserve of appearance cannot be immediately seen. In consequence the distance of participation between appearing and hyper-appearing, and between appearance and appearing, is also the distance of speculation and *eros*. To say, with Henry and most of modernity, that this premodern realism was "naîve" is itself naïve. For premodernity usually did not imagine that real things unproblematically show themselves to us. Instead their realism assumed (as with the *Meno* problematic and its resolution in terms of recollection) that truth belongs to the divine, and that our minds are orientated by the divine towards truth. There was already something like "faith" here, even if this was vastly augmented in the Christian era.

In fact, once one has grasped this point, the "turn to the subject" is disclosed as something other than a critical recognition that we only know beings as known. This, after all, had been known at least since Socrates. What was new, was rather the disjoining of faith from reason, brought about by the univocity of being: when beings as analogical had not been fully knowable in themselves, then a full knowledge of them was referred to God who is *esse*, as their source, and God as exceeding the range of our knowledge could only be properly known through self-disclosure, revelation. Without the recourse of faith, therefore, or rather without conceiving reason ultimately as faith, the invisible ceases to be participable, and instead appears as merely the limit of the knowable. To head off the resulting sceptical crisis, Descartes invented a new sort of immanent security in the *cogito* and the inward presence of the infinite. But within the terms of this security, the invisible, if it is to be known, cannot be participated in, but must itself present itself to immediate intuition.

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Since conjecture is banished, must not the invisible be identified with its saturated, indeterminate presence and become itself hypostasised indeterminacy? So here the true distance of transcendence, along with both faith and participation, have in fact been lost. Once we are freed from Victorian typologies, we can see that the Hellenic and the Hebraic legacies were mutually supporting, and that both were compromised in the same gesture.

If the Greeks reckoned better with the invisible than post-Cartesian modernity, then the Christian legacy upheld the visible in a way that Henry's hyper-Cartesianism denies. It certainly grasped the ephemerality of time, and the fading of appearances. But this was read in terms of the truth to itself of finitude, such that where this ephemerality was admitted, there was, after all, a measure of real being through participation, whereas when it was denied, and finitude sought to found itself in itself, then it truly vanished altogether. St. Augustine most profoundly articulated this, by insisting that we must remain within time despite its vanishing. When we try to possess a present moment, then indeed we are dissipated by the inherent loss of time, but when we let time pass as an image of eternity, then it passes like a liturgical hymn, and after all takes on a measure of form and coherence through the relationality of notes and rhythms. And since time allows the radical relationality of co-inherence essential to the subsistence of things, it is actually temporal passing which for now most shows to us the infinite subsistent relationality of the Trinity, beyond the finitude of mere substance. In this way, Christian tradition has recognised, like Henry, the abstraction and ephemerality of appearances as temporally arising, but unlike Henry, it has seen that their passing into death can be taken as their existing as signs of eternal life. Only where one seeks to suppress this passing, is one left with an illusory presence that is purely death.

Yet Henry in his own way does suppress this passing, since he does not remain with time in order to pass beyond time to eternity, but instead denies to time any real share in reality, and escapes instead to a supposed finite presence outside the temporal. What "life" can possibly be gained here? For the runner only runs as also the virtual spectator of his running, else he could never envisage his run as running, nor know that his exertion was any more than effort. Every run is from place to place, and places are signs and appearances. The exhilaration that the runner feels is in part his rapid survey of passing spaces, known and partially unknown; it is also himself imagining his own flow from afar. All this "secondariness" is nonetheless given with the second step beyond *stasis* that makes the run a run. Yes, to be sure, the spectator can only know fully of running if he has felt the strain and the motion, or at least imagined it—but between these outer and inner perspectives, there is then an intertwining reciprocity that interrupts all auto-constitution.

By affirming the prior reality of the material inward, apart from the ideal and formal reality of visibility and time, Henry consummates the Cartesian

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gesture of seeking for immanent security, instead of the faithful affirmation of the participation of passing in transcendence. Then the latter tends to be called upon "occasionally", as an ontic idol which guarantees sustained identity and intersubjectivity. This gesture, I have already suggested, was not critical necessity, but an outcome of ontotheological idolatry. (Of course, Marion has himself demonstrated this better than anyone else, yet his Husserlian commitment still ties him in some way to a "subjective turn", and a strange mixture of this with the premodern). Now it can be added that the real "turn to the subject" was the deepened Renaissance sense of temporality, historicity, human creativity and the dormant powers within nature. Although this new sense raised sceptical spectres, it was also originally but a deepening of the Augustinian vision: the human power to innovate itself attends to and mediates the divine inexhaustibility. Since the passing of time alone allows the dynamic of participation, then only a creative openness is receptive of the divine initiative. The Cartesian turn, however, is a counter-Renaissance reaction which idolatrously seeks security outside the flux of passage—and therefore denies immanent force and participated creativity, by divorcing thought from invention/discovery of the new: instead external reality is but endless permutations of extension and abstract motion, while no intellectual innovation can exceed the parameters of predefined method.

Henry's neo-Cartesianism repeats this subordination of time, which is yet more fundamental to Cartesianism than mind/body duality. Certainly he refuses the latter, but on the basis of such subordination he erects what he describes as "ontological dualism". Here there is invisible life over-against visible world. Since consciousness is rooted in life as auto-affection, it may seem that Henry extends consciousness beyond subjectivity. But the denial of any root for consciousness in the world preserves and even further extracts, the real essence of Cartesianism. To know an external shaped thing, supposedly there must first be auto-affection, and all that is really knowable of this thing is the modulation of self-feeling which it instigates, or perhaps occasions. But there is no awakening to consciousness that is not also things showing themselves to us as forms and signs. Feelings are attached to shapes; shapes are shaped by feeling them—here also there is reciprocity.

The second problem with the idea of auto-affection is that it conveys immediacy in a nonetheless reflexive grammatical form. Is this a merely semantic betrayal? Surely not, because "affecting" logically implies a duality, and therefore "self-affecting" implies reflexivity. Normally, when we are thinking, we are intending objects through signs, and therefore we are also in some sense reflecting on objects, and on ourselves as actors manipulating objects. We do not necessarily reflect upon ourselves as pure subjects of awareness, it is true, but this does not mean that awareness is entirely non-reflexive, for it is always intentional awareness of something, which assumes that already we have separated ourselves from that thing, which displays itself back to us. The example of the dream does not negate this, whatever

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Descartes may have thought. (At the end of the "Sixth Meditation" he denies memory to dreaming). For in the dream we have to do both with memory and imagination, and therefore always with the operation of the external world upon us (and we tend to detect even more traces of this since Freud) through the foldings within us of both time and space. We have no ground for supposing that a sheerly isolated mind could ever dream. Likewise, with the emotions. The Cartesian man's relief that his wife has died, no more arises mainly from himself, than his superficial sensations of gloom and melancholia. It also arises from his wife's intrinsic character, or at least from the effect of that character upon his own. Here Marion talks of "unreal" emotions registering "values" that have nothing to do with objects. This seems to betray a reversion to neo-Kantianism that takes no account of recent critiques of fact/value duality, and appears to suggest that he accepts some sort of contemporary version of the Cartesian physical world—drained of forces, values and secondary qualities. (Sublime greatness and all that arouses wonder, is not, for Marion, any more than for Descartes—or Kant—really "in" objects, but instead rebounds from the object as an irreal valuing in the subject). All richness, for Marion, accrues mysteriously within, as though a *Deus ex Machina* were at hand.

The same goes for the will. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas knew, soberly, only of a willing that was a being-affected by something, a desiring-something, and a being-drawn by something. They did not fantasise, like Descartes, an absolute and indifferent will (which has Stoic, Pelagian, semi-Pelagian and Ockhamist roots). They rightly eschewed any pure will entirely in charge of itself through a process of self-government. For where the will governs and mitigates the passions, it nonetheless undergoes a higher passion for the Good and the True, which forms it can only "recollect" (according to Plato and Augustine) via the mediation of finite realities that display these infinite qualities. Therefore, the will only wills as moved by an exterior, or else, in exceeding the visible, it moves towards an imagined exterior. Even in the latter instance, it is not formless, and does not aim merely at its own willing and self-control—unless indeed it has become a demonic will, since all we fully control is the deficient willing of evil.

In the third place, however, there remains the issue which Henry and Marion rightly raise, concerning the nature of the subject that represents or intends. Yet this way of putting the question can disguise already fatal assumptions. If one reverts to an Augustinian and Thomist construal of intentionality, then there is no subject (since it is really the soul) in surplus of intentions. It is not that a subject "has" intentions, but that the soul *is* intentions, or the unfolding of *eide* within psyche. The question then becomes, how can the soul potentially be all intentions, and how can it combine them? Is it not some sort of container? But the answer must be "no": as the "place" of forms, the soul is not really other than the commingling and interaction of forms. In their intensity of combination and full activity, they are the

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intellective soul—whose coherence and truth (beyond Hume and Deleuze) depend upon the appointed order and affinity amongst forms, not upon singleness of substance.

But can this apply to feelings also? Yes it can. If I am in pain, I am always also reflexively and intentionally distanced from my pain. Even Wittgenstein got this wrong, since in thinking of pain only as active behaviour (though it certainly has this aspect), and not as in any way an object, he was still trying in Cartesian fashion to distinguish subjectivity from objectivity. His denial of an inner glance is surely correct, and yet pain-as-performance in another way sustains a dualism. Wittgenstein betrays this by saying that our temptation in speaking of pains and so forth is falsely to apply the grammar of representing objects to the grammar of the experiencing subject. Such dualism seems to ignore the fact that in representing we are also feeling and being altered in our subjectivity, while in feeling a pain one is also distanced from one's pain, since it is the registering of something real by one's body, and an experience of one's body as a doubling-over of physical reality, whereby, indeed, the body affects itself, and yet certainly in a reflexive manner, precisely because the sphere of the animal and human body is not a Cartesian inner theatre.

By proposing a subjective grammar of pure act without representation of an object, Wittgenstein, the enemy of Schopenhauer and proponent of pure exteriority, turns out to be oddly akin to Henry, the friend of Schopenhauer and proponent of pure interiority. Wittgenstein's pain is, indeed, public pain that only exists in communicating itself (as cry, as gesture and so forth), whereas Henry's pain is private pain that ceases to be pain once it is exhibited. However, both pains are immediate and auto-affecting. And, oddly, Henry can be used to correct Wittgenstein. For it seems that Wittgenstein did not realise that if thought and action always inhabit language, then indeed they inhabit a world of spectres. This is the oft-noted conundrum of "linguistic idealism". For yes, signs are out there, objectively recognisable, but as signs they negate this objectivity. Furthermore, forms likewise negate this objectivity, in such a fashion that objects themselves are abstract. For we only seize objects under a succession of formal aspects, and these formal aspects are themselves abstracted always already, such that the cup is already as cup another cup, bigger or smaller, the red is already a red that could be painted on elsewhere and so forth. (Forms are "incorporeals" in the terms of Stoic philosophy.) Nor could any of these forms subsist by themselves, not even, for our imagination, in any possible combination. A red surface is not a fully-fledged material object. It requires, at least, the supplement of matter, yet matter, as has been known since at least Aristotle (once one was past the baby murmurings of mythologising materialists), is a ghost that cannot inhabit itself but only dwells parasitically within form. It gives an odd sort of solidity, and perhaps it is but the illusion of depth given by forms in certain combinations, whose riddle we could never hope to decipher.

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Henry is therefore right as to the fractal ineffability of the external visible world (but wrong to read this as having only nihilist implications, and to flee from it to the disappointed *noblesse de robe* citadel of interiority). And this means that while Wittgenstein is also right to say that all is exterior, he is utterly wrong to suppose that this aids the dissolution of false metaphysical *conundra*. To the contrary, it delivers all over to *aporia*, where the real roads offered are always sign-posted "nihilism" or "theology". But both thinkers are wrong not to see that even in pain there is intended form, since pains have elusive shapes that we imagine (they are dull thuds or squatting toads or piercing steel), and when they are articulated they take form as cry or wince, which is representable. But in taking on form and publicness, they sustain their ineffability.

In not grasping this ineffability and abstractness of the exterior, Wittgenstein missed the valid interiority of the traditional soul, which is simply the occurrence on the surface of the abstracting of things from themselves as themselves, and their consequent folding over upon themselves and into one another—since as abstract they only exist in sequences of relation, co-belonging and co-articulation. Red has absolutely nothing to do with a surface, but we cannot think red without surface, nor solid and opaque surface without some colour. By contrast, Henry refuses the soul for the subject, because he will not allow that the fractal exterior is merely the sign of the nothingness of things in themselves and the evidence of their createdness. Since, as such, they are the traces of spirit, it is natural that they can gather themselves again here and there into a certain echo of spirit, which is *psyche*.

Therefore, all turns upon the reading of the surface fractals. Nihilism hypostasises their vanishing; neo-Cartesianism retreats from them into the subject at last fully grasped; a third option sees in them the recovered passage from *eide* to *psyche*.

In terms of this third option, there is distancing from one's own experienced pain. It cannot be the distancing from the suffering self of a purely empty and representing subject, which, if available only through self-intention, would be doomed to an *aporetic* regress, as with Kant. To the contrary, the distanced pain, as "feeling of something", is simply accomplished by another *intentio*, another specific thought or desire—since, as Aristotle said, the activity of the thought is identical with the activity of the thinking subject. Certainly this means that there is an endless chain of deferral and supplementation involved in all mental experience: however, this is not the ironic deferral of an endlessly receding, pure and empty subject. Instead, it is the retaining and delay that belongs intrinsically to meaning, which is always unfinished. (Although such unfinishedness is, indeed, only saved from nihilism if we intend, obscurely, metaphysical and theological finality.)

In the fourth place, if the *cogito* is the *donum*, it is an impoverished *donum*. Generosity, in Descartes, begins as generosity towards oneself, or rather, as an expansive willing, that already is, auto-affectively, generosity. It is just

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this Cartesian generosity, which, we have seen, Marion re-works as a pure self-instigating will that must affirm the reality of the gift, and itself as co-given. If such generosity is, in a second instance, sacrificial, then it is important to realise that a pure self-sacrifice unto utter loss must always dialectically presuppose a prior self-possession altogether outside gift, which may then be subsequently offered. This is unlike evangelical ecstasy where one originally loses one's life to gain it, and therefore there is no self before gift and sacrifice, and yet, just for that reason, there is an original supplemented self that is a return of self to self in the very outgoing.

Again, if generosity means not the giving of a specific gift, and the opening of a specific path and goal to the other, but is rather the allowing to the other of his own will and freedom, then this means that, before gift and sacrifice, we esteem the instance of self-possession in others. And this is because we know of such self-possession in ourselves and esteem it first of all in our own egos. If the gift, therefore, is primarily one-way self-sacrifice, then this is only because it is more originally a gift that one gives to oneself. In Descartes, as we have seen, there is in pity (and in joy) no exchange of substantive affections about this or that, only a Stoic crossing of the regards of mutual self-respect between the commanders of the Baroque monadic fortresses of the will. There is a restriction, therefore, of reciprocity. But Descartes' remorseless logic reveals that that where the gift does not include from the outset reciprocity, then it is self-regarding and self-rewarding before it is sacrificial. And this remorseless logic unmasks the "call of the other" in both Levinas and Marion. Likewise, Descartes' generosity unmasks Marion's "charity", since Descartes' generosity, as he says, is really but a democratic reworking of pagan magnanimity. Since, nonetheless, Descartes construes charity (as opposed to the merely natural affection of *amour*, which includes natural sympathy) after this model, charity for him reduces to "regard" for another who does not appear, and no longer involves the specific and affective union of minds and bodies entertained by the gospel. Marion follows suit: his fear that a visible other will be an altered other effectively demonises influence, and reduces all objectivity to the masterable. But does charity exclude influence and learning? And is the manifest world created by eternal charity the world only of dominion? Replies seem scarcely necessary.

Ultimately, the infinite and indifferent will in Descartes is of a piece with his metaphysics of *causa sui*. Self-affection is in God self-causing, the willed priority of God even over himself in himself. Marion's own incomparable scholarship has confirmed the Cartesian *causa sui* as the very capping-stone of ontotheology. Yet in espousing voluntarism, self-affection, the phenomenological reduction to immediacy, and indeed a God in himself beyond his own *esse*, does not Marion himself perpetuate precisely the metaphysics of *causa sui*?

Later in this essay I shall further demonstrate the ontotheological origin of the refusal of reciprocity, through a consideration of Fènelon and Kant. But

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the aridity and futility of the second contemporary attempt to exceed the Cartesian subject—the paradoxical denigration of vision by phenomenology itself—should already be apparent.

6. The Subjective Turn

The third contemporary attempted modification of Cartesian subjectivity is "subjectivity without individualism"—associated with Alain Renaut and the somewhat bizarrely Quixotic French late twentieth-century revival of liberal humanism.[48] Within this outlook, a purely finite autonomy of the will, supposedly derived from Kant, is to be defended—an autonomy which is prior to the inflection of desire by either good or evil. Such autonomy is to be regarded as the basis for responsibility, and a more-than-individualistic respect for the other.

Here, one has to do, yet more explicitly, with a defence of Kantian ethical reasoning. I have already indicated why I do not think that this reasoning is non-individualistic, and this will be elaborated below. If such a conclusion is correct, then the removal of the soul as "subject" away from interobjectivity, is irredeemably tied to modern liberal contractualism, and a fundamentally monadic and fated egotism—whereas Renaut wishes to separate Kant's practical reason from his monadic metaphysics of noumena. Indeed, any "ethics of finitude", as Renaut desires, is bound to appeal to some immanently total foundation which echoes finitude's supposed circumscription—whether this be the individual or the collectivity, which is but the individual writ large. However, it will also be contended against Renaut, that in Kant's case we are not offered an unequivocal ethics of finitude, any more than the Kantian critique of theoretical reason concerns, unambiguously, a "radical finitude". Instead, the Kantian ethical subject is uneasily (and in the end disastrously) bifurcated between a newly constructed empty "sublime" transcendence, on the one hand, and a self-enclosed and totalised "beautiful" finitude, on the other.

My final desire, then, is that we should abandon the attempt to modify the regime of subjectivity with postmodern trans-humanism or else phenomenological intersubjectivity, or else again the neo-Kantian ethics of finitude, and instead attempt to recover the regime of the soul.

However, desiring, of course, is not enough. And the regime of subjectivity has not, it would seem, been first of all established in the ethical domain, but rather in that of theoretical knowledge.

Here the obstacle to be overcome is not merely the first establishment of the regime by Descartes, but also its more formidable re-establishment by Kant. Even today, it seems to me, this issue is evaded, and Kant is still primarily taken on his own terms as having instituted a "critical break" from which there is no going back. Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein and the pragmatists, (and even Deleuze?) all in the last analysis

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see themselves as re-working a transcendental turn, albeit now often described as "quasi-transcendental". All of them, therefore, still think that in some way permanently identifiable "boundaries" of what there is to be known, or even of what there is, "appear" to human reason. And yet even intuitively this appears to be a problematic claim, since a boundary can only be established by crossing it: it would seem, therefore, that an absolute boundary to knowledge could never be known of, since one thereby would have to know also the other side to the boundary, rendering it less than absolute and forever receding.[49] Two further considerations support this reaction.

First of all, what Kant thought of as "metaphysics" had only existed since early modern scholasticism, and was not a legacy of the ancient Greeks and the earlier middle ages. This "metaphysics" was itself very nearly "epistemological" in orientation, since, as pure ontology prior to theology, it already tended to reduce the *ens* to a pure possibility of being known by the finite subject. This suggests that Kant's metaphysics completes, as metaphysics, the very metaphysics that it claims to overturn.[50] Secondly, the conviction that "bounds" will "appear" also seems to repeat the assumption made by a construal of being as univocal, that finite being is fully comprehensible on its own terms, and does not require to be referred by analogical attribution to the infinite. Hence the heart of Kantian critique is little more than a mutilated analogy of being erected on the basis of an assumed univocity, which in consequence confines analogy to projection upon God of ratios equivalent to those found in finitude, without any eminent attribution to God of finite contents.[51] Thus theology is bound to ask, is not the supposed critical turn in philosophy merely the result of pursuing one option (univocity) within theology, and therefore not at all something that theology must somehow "come to terms with"? On the contrary, it would seem that theology, alone, can call the critical turn into question. But just because it can rationally do so, the turn becomes, even for philosophy, questionable.

Uncertainty about the "Kant issue" perhaps hovers over contemporary phenomenology. Can one radicalise Husserl's orientation to Berkeley rather than to Kant? Can one radicalise an orientation that permits manifestness and meaning to belong to things in themselves, ontologically? (A denial that Berkeley is "idealist" is here assumed.)[52] By contrast, the notion of reduction to given donation still continues a transcendental quest for bounds, even if these are now located (as by Jean-Luc Marion in *Étant Donnée*) in the anonymous and always missed appearing of an absolutely pure, self-donating subject to a purely grateful and equally uncharacterisable subjective recipient of whom the donor is essentially unaware. Here there persists an initial ignoring of the possibility of analogical participation and ontological reciprocity, on the basis of a claim somehow passively "to know", within pure philosophy, the confines of our finitude. This limit, as we have seen, is

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bounded by the sublime saturated phenomenon which exceeds all conjectural conceiving and imagining. It is, for Marion, as far as philosophy is concerned, the site of the possible revealed manifestation of the transcendent. He proceeds to give (brilliant) and instructive phenomenological accounts of this possibility, including of the Christ of the gospels regarded in this suspended light. Yet if the appearing content of the gospels is contingently revealed, then it cannot, as Marion seems to claim, be discursively elaborated within the space of transcendental immanence.[53] Inversely, if it is so elaborated, and yet elaborated only as possibility, then phenomenology has stepped outside phenomenology into speculation.

None of these contorted subterfuges are, however, necessary. For if my earlier critique of *Étant Donnée* is correct, then the hard line which Marion draws between phenomenology and theology cannot hold. For this depends entirely upon the operation of the *epoché* which alone distinguishes between transcendental immanence and real ontological transcendence. Without this distinction, as I have argued, fundamental philosophy is opened up to construction, speculation and feeling. And this means that theology can very well contaminate our account of what ineluctably appears from the outset. It need no longer be that the revealed arrives as some "item" (however sublime and saturating) within a pre-defined epochal domain (and incidentally these conditions make Marion's account of revelation perhaps Suarezian and not Thomist, and perhaps also unacceptably interiorist and spiritualising). Instead, revelation may colour everything from the very commencement, since, according to the best Christian tradition, it arrives simultaneously as both exterior event of appearance and inner illumination. The latter occurs as elevated feeling, ecstatic speculation and expressed word or image.[54]

By contrast to Marion's account, abandonment of a transcendental phenomenology would mean also abandonment of the modern passive subject standing over-against objects. Instead, it would allow the emergence of a phenomenology linked with the soul and not the subject, for which appearing, and even intuiting and intending, in some measure would belong to objects as much as to subjects. And conversely, appearance-to-a-subject would be seen as inseparable from the contingency of events and their occurrence in part through memory and judgement. (Marion's own superb account in *Étant Donnée* of appearance as event, and the conjoined priority of effect over cause, is here indispensable.)[55]

But is this really a possibility, and can one really question the Kantian legacy?

In sketching out such a questioning in sections 7–11 below, we shall see how all can be inverted. It would seem that the regime of the subject in the theoretical sphere prevents reciprocity, and permits only a restricted "intersubjectivity"; but instead it will be shown how the regime of the subject is itself most fundamentally the ungrounded refusal of reciprocity within the practical sphere.

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7. Non-Reciprocity and Disinterest

This refusal, it will now be argued, is fundamentally linked to the tradition of the disinterested love of God—a tradition which, it will be shown, arises within the terms of ontotheology. First we shall see how this is displayed in Fènelon, and then in a much more complex way in Kant.

Hans Urs von Balthasar and other writers have shown that, in the early modern period, spiritual writers became more and more obsessed with the idea of loving God for himself alone, quite apart from any questions of one's own salvific destiny and the regard of God towards oneself.[56] This amounted to a purging of the divine/human relation from any connotations of inter-subjectivity in the most fundamental sense of reciprocity. Perhaps the most important exponent of this "disinterested" love of God, or "quietism", was the essentially Cartesian theologian Fènelon, and one can observe in his work isomorphisms between his treatment of the various categories of the sublime, the naîve, and disinterestedness. Fènelon did not view the path of disinterest as one that must be followed for salvation, nor as one likely to be attained by many, but nonetheless regarded it as the higher way. His basis for doing so was the truth that, for God, there can be nothing more than God, and hence that the end of divine action is, properly speaking, solely his own glory. Since our happiness is, in consequence, only a subaltern, and not a final end, a perfected love of God will identify with his absolute aseity, to the point of entire unconcern with one's own finite well-being. Mysteriously, God allows most souls to rest content with "quelque retour sur elles-mêmes", but a few he raises beyond such childishness, as Fènelon regards it.[57] This refusal, by Fènelon, of any "gesture of return", exactly correlates with his elevation of the Sublime over and above the Beautiful. For in Fènelon, the ideally transparent style of the Bible ensures that we simply pass through and beyond words towards the divine, without any "return" upon their formed perfection which would ensure that they too are taken up, in an ever more "eminent" mode, into the divine perfection. Instead, a one-way journey leaves words behind in a pure unconsciousness of any medium. This "unconsciousness" corresponds to the utter surrendering of any awareness of self in the mystical experience of disinterest. And one can see how the category of the naîve mediates the sublime with the mystical unconscious; for the naîve person is one who is unconscious of himself as a medium: by being unaware of what he is saying he turns himself, along with his words, into a transparent medium which "disinterestedly" fades towards the truth.

Wholly relevant to an analysis, which I shall shortly supply, of the out-working of this tradition regarding disinterest in the thought of Kant, is an assessment of it in theological and philosophical terms. Much within it is certainly anticipated by currents in mediaeval thought, and indeed it can be interpreted as an attempt (somewhat in the fashion of Descartes), to re-assert

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God's ontological difference from creatures in the face of an era which tended to reduce God to a supreme but merely ontic causal factor within the totality of being; in this sense a univocal application of a model of inter-subjective reciprocity to our relation to God did indeed result in idolatry. Nevertheless, there were perhaps three main reasons why the pre-modern Christian tradition had held back from the extremity of Fènelon's conclusions. First of all, as Balthasar remarks, if our relation to God has ceased to be in any sense a matter of hope—since of course God himself is not in need of hope—then has not this relationship become strikingly depersonalised? For to claim to acknowledge God in abstraction from our own hopes and fears may indicate a self-obliteration in the face of otherness, but it may also—and paradoxically—indicate a hubristic identification with this otherness, and an attempted but impossible crossing of the creator-created divide.

The second reason was that to imagine such a crossing to be possible indicates that one does not, after all, respect the ontological difference between God as Being itself, on the one hand, and creatures as existing in this or that fashion, on the other. For if one is a mere creature, then the only possible crossing or transformation one can undergo is from one such ontic state to another. Furthermore, to imagine that respect for God's pursuit of his own glory can sacrificially supersede our own happiness, is actually to imagine that, as regards ends, God is in competition with us or hierarchically surmounts us within the same ontic series and on the same ontic plane—as if, once again, he were merely an exalted being and not Being as such. In this way not the reciprocal model (duly qualified), but rather the model of pure self-denial, tends to reduce God to the ontic level. By contrast, it is just because nothing can really be added to God, that our own happiness is somehow taken up into God's aseity. In other words, if God is more than us, we cannot "leave behind" any aspect of the perfection of beings without implying that God is, after all, less than the totality of beings. In the unique case of God alone, since he is Being as such, we can surrender everything, while knowing that we lose nothing; rather such surrendering is the very condition of true gaining, or of being at all. Hence the lack of a *retour* in Fènelon would involve not just our own diminution, but the diminution of God, whose aseity must thereby be envisaged, not as the eminent, infinite realisation of all formal perfections as glimpsed in creatures, but rather as an infinitely empty breaking with such formations. It can therefore be seen just how the quietist God who demands self-indifference is a God reconceived as sublime rather than transcendent: that is to say, as sublime without the eminence of infinite beauty. (It should be noted here that the original Longinian as well as the Renaissance and even the Baroque sublime up to Boileau was not yet contrasted with the beautiful: Fènelon's treatment of the sublime was a moment in the drift towards such sundering.)[58]

The third reason for earlier caution concerns the problem of exactly what constitutes God's loveability. Do we love him for his own sake alone?

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For every charm, every attractive feature of anything whatsoever, radiates outwards, rendering things apprehensible and therefore specifically loveable only in the measure that they affect the state of the observer in a positive fashion. It therefore follows, and again paradoxically, that to love anything purely for itself, in abstraction from the special quality of its influence upon oneself, is not at all to love that thing in its specificity, but rather to love it for that mere abstract and univocal quality of "being" that it shares with everything else conceivable. In the case of persons, the qualifier "free" may be adjoined to the ontic term, but the same abstractness, non-specificity and generality remains. In the case of God himself, it follows that "to love him for his own sake" would turn out to mean not only to over-identify with him, but also to over-identify with a mere cipher, with a sublime void, or at best an infinite will forever suspended over us.

8. *The Quietist Kant*

However precisely mediated to Kant through Lutheran pietism, his ethical and aesthetic writings are marked by an elevation of the disinterested above the interested. If, indeed, it is true that Kant mentions "an interest" which we must have in the practical bringing about of the law in future time, he nonetheless also insists that this is a secondary moment, because the law must first itself be regarded with pure impersonal objectivity.[59] This indeed means that practical reason, or "ethics", as Kant makes clear in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, is itself grounded in, made lawful by, an instance that is more purely contemplative than the gnoseological procedures classified by Kant as "theoretical" in the first critique, but later characterised as "technical practical" in the *Opus Postumum*.[60] Practical reason proposes to itself "maxims" directed towards the ends of action, but these only qualify as the "basis of legislation" if they can be taken as instantiating "duties" which make no reference to specific ends (nor the "virtues" which partially or fully instantiate those ends) but exclusively to the formal procedures which all activity, and proposed values for activity, must assume.

These "duties" comprise first the "narrow" duties which must always be entirely fulfilled, and concern the exercise of freedom with indifference as to ends, always within the constraint of not conflicting with the freedom of others; second, the "wide" duties which can never be entirely fulfilled, and which concern our own perfection of motivation and the willing of the happiness of others, again with initial indifference as to what should or can constitute this happiness. In the case of the "wide" duties, there are ethical ends that are themselves duties, named by Kant "duties of virtue".[61] However, the teleology here results from legislation, not the other way round: for just as freedom is a given whose character requires certain procedures without regard to ends, so also it demands for the sake of its own consistency an ever increased respect for these procedures—an ever deepened advance

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towards pure disinterest never quite attainable. And so, also, the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain is a given of human nature in its animal aspect, which, again without regard to ends, dictates to us an inevitable law of nature, which with respect to ourselves we obey by instinct without prompting. In the case of others, however, a respect for the human dignity of freedom elicits from us also a secondary respect for that animality with which this freedom is always conjoined.[62] Here the natural law deducible from the given renders the pursuit of the goal of the happiness of others also our duty. Thus we can see that, in the case of the wide duties as much as the narrow ones, or in the case of prescribed virtues as much as the respect of human rights, ethics in its entirety—defined as the question of the ends we should pursue—is subordinated (as Kant specifically says) to "the doctrine of Right", which is a purely contemplative regard for how things are: the conjoint noumenal/phenomenal order of reality which Kant demands that we regard with a pure self-dissolving awe, purged of all concern for our own delight or destiny.[63] Or, indeed, concern as to the delight or destiny of others: to attain disinterestedness here means to have regard only to the pure possibility of freedom or happiness as attainable by each individual taken in the abstract.

At the centre, therefore, of Kant's account of morality, is the passing over of an "interested" concern with putting the moral law into effect, which also involves a certain "feeling" (*gefühl*) of "regard" for the law, towards the entirely disinterested standpoint of the law itself, which is properly acknowledged by the rational will.[64] His notion of disinterest here both continues and transfigures the quietist tradition: first of all, one can see how the near-impersonality of disinterested love has become in Kant a bare feeling of respect for the free person, which is only the trace within sensibility of a purely rational deduction of law by freedom itself in its autonomy. Kant fulfils the unstable logic of a disinterested love by making love itself—even love for the law—fade in favour of a rationally induced duty. Secondly, one can see how the equally unstable notion of a total identification with God who is the infinite creator by a merely finite creature is in effect "resolved" by Kant, in so far as he does not make God immediately the object of disinterested identification, but rather the moral law (or the law of freedom) which holds equally for God and humanity alike. Here Kant is more crudely ontotheological than Fènelon, since he reintroduces, and indeed accentuates, the Cartesian equality between God and humanity with respect to the "indifference" of will. And indeed it is just this Cartesian univocal leveling of spirits, as mediated by Leibniz's monadology, which ensures that, in Kant, the fundamental ontological division is between all spirits (*noumena*), on the one hand, and sensible appearances (*phenomena*), on the other hand, rather than the creator/created divide which had previously been taken, by Augustinian and Thomist tradition, to comprehend (even if it also excedes) the ontological difference.

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It is this same univocity of will which permits the transition in the experience of the sublime from one of frustration at the limitations of our intuition—we cannot envisage the infinite—to one of emotional release at discovering that, nonetheless, "practically" speaking—or rather in terms of a higher theoretical attention to freedom—we can, after all, identify with the infinite.[65] Such identity rules out, for Kant, all prayer, worship and liturgy as still superstitious: as still, in fact, confined within that first phase of the sublime experience when we take the immeasurable to be an object of fear, rather than properly one of awe before an infinite nature that is also our own nature.[66] But once we have crossed the abyss of anxiety, and arrived at the confidence of a purely moral faith, honour should only be paid to God in terms of the willing of the law—precisely that attempt to conform sensibility to moral duty which Kant takes to be the aspect of "interest" within the sphere of the ethical.

All the same, this last point alerts us to the fact that Kant does not altogether substitute the moral law for God as the object of genuine disinterest. Human beings cannot entirely rid themselves of interest, and directly identify with the law, just because for them obedience to the law is not automatic, but rather an imperative "ought", "which reason by itself prescribes", precisely "to a rational, yet sensuously affected being".[67] If our wills are free in the sense that they have a freedom which can be exercised with or against itself, rather than "holy" like God's will, which can only be exercised in accord with its freedom, then this is because we are also sensuous creatures drawn in the direction of self-love and so of the "interested". To say that we are not automatically lawful, but rather subject to the duty to obey the law, is to say that, although the autonomous self-legislation of freedom can be recognised by us in its rational integrity, nonetheless this recognition is always achieved in an alien fashion—namely through the idiom of feeling and sensation. Kant here faces a problem that he self-confessedly is unable to resolve: the difficulty of mediation between entirely heterogeneous capacities. Yet for the reasons just set out, Kant cannot avoid asserting such mediation: hence he speaks of "moral feeling" and of "respect" for the law as itself a matter of feeling, in such a fashion that here feeling takes a paradoxical "interest" in duty and law—the very principles of "disinterest".[68] Yet to assert this is to claim that "a mere thought containing nothing sensible in itself can bring about a sensation of pleasure",[69] or that something purely rational and immaterial can causally influence our sensations. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* Kant himself points out that this is an impossibility in terms of his own critical account of theoretical philosophy in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: causality can only be known about through experience, and the only causality we experience is that between empirically sensed items. Therefore Kant—with immense honesty and non-evasive rigour—concludes: "it is wholly impossible to explain how and why the universality of a maxim as a law—and therefore

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morality—should interest us". He goes on to insist that the law is not valid because it interests us: it is rather valid "for us as men in virtue of having sprung from our will as intelligence and so from our proper self." Since it is thereby known by us autonomously, it is certainly something into which we have some degree of insight: indeed it is something which is "deduced" by Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.[70] However, it is deduced from freedom, and since our freedom is for Kant always contaminated by sensibility, freedom itself, as indicated already in the *First Critique*, can only be an object of "faith", albeit "rational faith".[71] Since we do not, like God, reliably exercise our freedom, we cannot be entirely sure that we are free at all. In a permanent state of relative loss of freedom, we can only trust that we might be free, and this possibility must impinge upon us as a "sense" of freedom, even though, for Kant, freedom as such is not at all a matter of sense.

So what this category of "moral feeling" really exposes is that the *Second Critique* violates the limits upon understanding laid down in the *First Critique*, despite the fact that these limits were set forth by Kant in order to protect the unlimited noumenal from contamination by sensibility, rather than vice versa. For his tracing of our confinement to the sensible proved in certain respects too thorough to subserve his ultimate concern. It is supposed to be the case that in practical reason something-in-itself—namely our spirit—discloses itself, and we attain after all to an ontology beyond appearances. And yet now we see that this disclosure requires a sensible mediation every bit as much as does theoretical reason, such that the categorical imperative is apparently "empty" without the intuitive instances of feeling coming into operation, although the latter, equally, would be "blind" without its recognition of a moral law indifferent to feeling. In consequence, it follows that there is nothing to legitimate Kant's claim that the categorical imperative is a category of pure reason, rather than of empirical understanding; it seems that this category also must be "schematised" (despite Kant's explicit denial that this is required) in terms of feelings which involve "interests" and therefore contingencies, and in consequence space and time, just as much as categories of the understanding like "cause" or "substance" can only refer to spatio-temporal instantiation.[72]

Thus human beings never surpass a certain "interest" in the moral law: they have a negative feeling for it which registers it always together with the need to suppress and subdue ordinary selfish interests. And it is for just this reason that the moral law cannot quite displace God as the object of disinterest, and a purer quietism must return: moral feeling is only redeemed from arbitrariness through the faithful postulation of a divine "holy will" where the law is established on its own account.

This projection requires with some inevitability the displacement of freedom towards God: for if freedom is other to the causally determined, then it must arrive from an absolute freedom. It does not occur to Kant, as to

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later writers, to see our own freedom as absolute, since he thinks that in us it is always adulterated by sensibility. Hence there must be a higher source of freedom, which is purely free, and it is this pure freedom that first and foremost articulates itself as the moral law, even if we can univocally echo this articulation on our own account. Furthermore, if freedom is real and transcendent and therefore sovereign over nature, this sovereignty cannot be guaranteed by us, and so we must remain uncertain about the power and even the reality of freedom, if it is ours alone. Our freedom cannot consistently command happiness, since frequently the morally good are not justly rewarded with physical well-being. Only the hidden providence of God, the future breaking in of his kingdom and the last judgement, will ensure such sovereignty which constitutes the *summum bonum*: the fulfilling both of strict duties of freedom and of wide duties towards the happiness of others which alone ensures freedom's non-inhibition by the realm of strict causal connection. Equally, it is only God who ensures the fulfilling of wide duty towards one's own perfection.[73] Here again one sees just how far the hold of interest extends over the human person: because nature is not fully in our command, the moral law is adequately fulfilled by us in terms of good willing alone, and yet because of the grip of self-interest over the will which Kant terms "radical evil", purity of motivation which alone secures the ethical can scarcely be guaranteed.[74]

Hence for all these reasons, it does not seem that the moral law can fully displace God as the object of disinterested regard, which in Kant is strictly speaking a rational not an emotional gaze. On the contrary, the moral law only veers towards a purely human derivation, the more it impinges in bastard form as not free of interest. It is, indeed, autonomously generated even by us, because of Kant's univocal construal of the will (in a Cartesian line of descent), but nonetheless we never have, like God, direct access to our own autonomy, which is always mediated through the haze of "feeling". In consequence, we can only assume our own autonomy if it is, as it were, underwritten by the divine autonomy. Therefore, as soon as we will the moral law on the grounds of our own freedom, we assent also to absolute freedom, to the sovereignty of freedom over nature, and the eschatological co-ordination of freedom with happiness. It follows that the obscure feeling for the moral law is also the sense of God, and that the strange feeling of "respect" for the law's disinterest, is still truly in essence a self-abnegation before the all-sufficient one, replete in his own freedom, and characterised only by the logical demands of this freedom.

It can therefore now be recognised that Kant, albeit in a complex fashion, reiterates the tradition of disinterested love of God. Indeed he takes this tradition to its logical conclusion by further depersonalising the object of a disinterested gaze—God becomes the logical outworking of infinite freedom—and by further depersonalising the disinterested gazer—he now exercises not love but a feeling of respect whose logic requires the feeling aspect to

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diminish. Hence Kant can be taken as illustrating my earlier argument to the effect that the doctrine of disinterested love tends both to lose a transcendent personal deity, and to lose love itself. But by the same token, Kant is all the more subject to the criticism made of this tradition in general: namely that it voids us before God only because it falsely imagines us to be in competition with him by forgetting that he is not in any sense another "being", however exalted. It is the legacy of this forgetting, combined with Kant's post-Cartesian and post-Newtonian assumption that freedom is alien to nature, which generates in his thought an idolised God who is first of all a raw freedom, or power with indifference to appointed ends, and, secondly, the ground of a happiness equally indifferent, since it is the mere mechanical resultant of certain causal processes. Such a God is no longer the consummation of a vision of specific glory and preferred order which we dimly sense, but merely the maximum infinite intensity (in post-Scotist fashion) of two abstractly and questionably isolated aspects of the world—liberty and happiness—which we assume we already fully comprehend in their finite instances. The only mystery which this God withholds is his secret co-ordinating of freedom and happiness beyond our grasp. And as we have now seen, the thought of this God is for Kant the thought of the ethical—which he has liberated from religion not one iota.

Clearly, in Kant, it is the disinterested regard for God which characterises the "true sublime", when fear before the physical cataracts of Sinai is submerged in confident identification with the noumenal power of the law, which those torrents merely betoken.[75] In the post-critical writings, it is manifestly this theological construal of the transcendent as sublime in the sense of disinterestedness, which helps to wrench the sublime apart from the emanating attractiveness of the beautiful. For Kant's God does not show his glory "beautifully" to the world; instead, he makes us painfully aware of a subjectivity so free from concern for objects that all traits of character and pursuit of desired goals become secondary—a subjectivity bizarrely de-subjectivised. It is this divine pressure which ensures that the sublime is associated in Kant only with rupture and not with reintegration, marking an absolute break with our natural pursuit of happiness and tranquility. Indeed, it ensures that, as Kant says, the sublime is marked by a painful sacrifice of the pleasures of intuition and theoretical or aesthetic cognition, in return for the divine gift of one's own being as freedom, with its infinite realisability.[76]

As with the ideal of the naîve, disinterest here ensures that utterance and personality fade towards the sublime object, rendering them transparent. And whereas, with Burke, the threat of the sublime remains in suspension in order that it may be enjoyed, and this enjoyment depends upon the subjective observer standing his ground at a safe distance, such transparency betokens a notion of the sublime always as a movement through and beyond the initial sublime experience of distance and terror. It is such (minimal

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and one-way) movement which moralises, but only through disinterested identification with otherness, for here the interactively mutual is refused as a game of erotic violence (and it is not seen that it need not be violent). Intersubjectivity is only regained as the self-obliteration of an essentially free-standing ego in favour of another such free-standing ego. To preserve community after the rise of a solipsistic philosophy, a logic of pure self-sacrifice must be the extreme tribute that such a stance has to pay to refused reciprocity.

In Kant, this is the only mode of strictly ethical recognition. All reciprocity —erotic affection, particular preference, acting out of warm feeling and not cold duty, plus any superogatory giving (hence perhaps charity on Marion's understanding as well as my own)—was relegated by the pre-critical Kant to a feminine, domestic and beautiful (not sublime) sphere; but by the critical Kant it is demoted to the amoral salon of the merely "charming". Yet what can it mean to recognise the other outside the preferential excess of giving, attention to specificity of her character, and the quest for reciprocal communication? It means that no highest value can be accorded to the variety of human needs, nor to distributive (as opposed to rectificatory) justice, nor to human inter-communion or friendship. All, then, that remains, is a sacrificial recognition and upholding of a "given" freedom that is not a gift. But such given freedom will materially present itself in the mode of property ownership, which secures the bodily conditions for the maintenance of "self-possession". Hence in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant makes it clear that the "sublime" ethics of duty only moves beyond foundations into manifest worldly consequence in the mode of a public morality of "Right", which is strictly focused on the safeguarding of abstract negative freedom and private property. By contrast, the morality of "Virtue" is confined by Kant to the strictly private and non-jurisprudential sphere.

9. *The Sublime and the Beautiful*

So far, it has been shown how the Kantian practical subject as disinterested is constructed through the devaluing of reciprocity: a devaluing which is no "critical" act, but rather the outcome of a cultural prejudice already well in evidence in the pre-critical Kant. But can the same thing be shown even of the Kantian theoretical subject? If this can be shown, then we can confirm that, as with Descartes, the modern subject displaces the soul, which, as we have seen, was precisely the site of reciprocity. Also it can be shown that this displacement as a whole is a matter of arbitrary (even possibly perverse) taste—with the implication that the Copernican turn itself (since it turns upon this lonely displaced subject) is less critique than assertion.

This demonstration has to be made in two stages. First of all, it must be shown that the subject of aesthetic judgement is also disinterested, and arises from an arbitrary refusal of reciprocity. Secondly, it has to be shown

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that this subject is the subject of judgement in general, which purely theoretical judgement requires and assumes.

The aesthetically judging subject registers both the sublime and the beautiful. However, the former is not so much judged as felt when it overwhelms us. That is why, for the critical Kant, the feeling of the sublime is relatively interested, although it transports us to the truly disinterested willing of the moral law. By contrast, the feeling of the beautiful is not so much felt as judged in the face of empirical instances which trigger off an experience of the general and entirely *a priori* coordination between reason, understanding, imagination and sensibility. Since, in this case, there is really no *ecstasis*, the experience of the beautiful is fundamentally one of disinterest, and "interests" in the beautiful are strictly subordinated to this purity: for example, if we have an "interest" in the social harmony generated by agreement in the judgement of the beautiful, this still refers to the shared "disinterested" experience by the isolated individual of pure beauty regarded for its own sake.[77]

The beautiful is registered disinterestedly, also because the worldly horizon is complete in itself, and does not subserve a divine *eros* which would conduct us, interestedly, above this horizon. It would seem here that this is a consequence of the boundary drawn round knowledge of finite things by the *First Critique*; likewise that the sublime saturated transgression of this boundary is the consequence of practical reason's demonstration of the realm of free noumena. The sublime and the beautiful are then experiences which mediate free unbounded practical reason, with bounded theoretical reason, which judges sensory intuitions only under fixed categorical rules.

However, if we deconstruct Kant, it is really the other way round: the sublime and the beautiful are the extreme poles which frame both reason and understanding. This follows, because, as we have seen, the passage to the moral law lies always through the experience of the natural sublime, which is, in itself, merely violent and amoral. Since, as with Marion's gift, the moral law does not really appear in its own right to feeling, there always remains a passage through ambiguity, a moment of hesitation on the abyssal brink, in which effectively we must decide, on no grounds, for the "moral" meaning of sublime violence as the voice securing Right to self-possession. Thus what sunders practical reasoning from theoretical is really the gulf between the sublime and the beautiful; for if the sublime could still (as for Longinus) take on form, then no absolute rupture from time and space would ensue, and no passage to the timeless noumenal as the site of ultimate imperatives. Nor could the beautiful or formed, as inciting *eros* and therefore itself also sublime and ecstatically unlimited, enclose any bounded domain. To complete this argument, we shall later see how it is indeed the beautiful which alone establishes for Kant the Copernican theoretical boundary in terms of the overarching range of aesthetic judgement.

But for now, one may note that the lack of mediation between the sublime and the beautiful, and so between the invisible and the visible, is also a lack of circulation, of reciprocity.

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10. Beauty and Disinterest

The doctrine of the beautiful as disinterestedly apprehended is expressed by Kant in the *Third Critique* in terms of a hierarchisation of the arts. At the very summit stands poetry, the most intellectual of the arts, which characteristically tries to schematise ideas that cannot be apprehended. Poetry is therefore an art dedicated to the sublime. It is only forced into words at the very limits of visual perception, and therefore does not transgress Kant's general preference for the visual over the audible.

Kant accords the second place to painting, which he takes as the paradigmatic site of the experience of the beautiful. And it is paradigmatic in four senses: as framed, as literal, as decorative, and as non-intrusive.

As framed, a picture provides us with a formed design that our mind can securely grasp. It is presumably this capacity which allows it "to penetrate much further into the region of ideas"[78] than the other formative arts, and by comparison with design, the use of colour in painting belongs merely to its "charm": that is to say, is not to do with its beauty at all (since charm, for the post-critical Kant, involves meretricious "interest").[79] Colours in their mixture may adventitiously transport our emotions on occasions, but well-ordered form will uniformly elicit from us a calm admiration.[80] (The mediaeval notion of colour as the generic object of sight is here refused.) It is precisely this form which constitutes the literal primary subject-matter of a painting, since it is not at all first and foremost a metaphor for something else. In addition, the design is primary and literal in the sense that we can always pick out the "main design" without ambiguity. This must be the case for Kant, since he argues that "ornamentation" or *parerga* are only an adjunct, which must be assessed in terms of their subserving the main theme. Such a verdict applies especially to the frames of the pictures, though also to drapery on statues and the colonnades of palaces.[81] Clearly, though, as Jacques Derrida indicates, the very idea of a frame assumes that there is a definable prime design which can be isolated and then complemented.[82] Were one to resist the notion of an isolatable "main design" and to persist, instead, with the notion of design as consisting in the entire co-ordination of all constitute elements of a painting, then everything at the border of the painting would have to be just as much part of the overall composition as elements at the centre. But this demand, of course, would always push the frame further and further outwards. If the entire picture plus frame is the picture, then what frames this picture-plus-frame? And if the eye inevitably sees the setting of the painting, should this setting not be in keeping with it—indeed belong to it as its "frame" as much as the original frame? In this way any absolute notion of a framed picture is abolished, and one is returned to an earlier notion of pictorial art, in which individual works were less autonomous, and were rather assessed only together with their architectural context, which in turn was inseparable from questions about the use of the building,

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the building's relation to the past and so forth. Questions of "interest" would in this way unquestionably intrude, and so one can see that Kant's attitude towards *parerga*, which shores up his elevation of painting over architecture, is intimately linked to his (impossible) attempt to isolate a "disinterested" object of beauty.

For it is as framed and clear in its isolatable dominant design that painting for Kant is primarily decorative. Certainly a painting may have a function—to commemorate, for example, or to impress—and it may, indeed, be mimetic. But these aspects do not encompass for Kant the beauty of a painting: this concerns, simply, the harmony of design as such. Hence while Kant affirms that the "ideal" in art arises only in the depiction of the human form, this ideality nonetheless concerns the joining of a representation of uniquely moral being to beauty of form, in which the mimetic component adds nothing to beauty, only to ideality. Indeed one can infer that, for Kant, painting is only the highest of the "formative arts", because of its capacity to frame and isolate. Otherwise, it is defined simply as "the art of design", and Kant regards as also particularly pure examples of disinterested beauty the patterns used in house-decoration, pure simple colours and isolated notes in music.[83] Sculpture ranks beneath painting because (one assumes) it is more dominated (in Kant's time) by mimesis and in its three-dimensionality precludes a perfect surveyability by the eye.[84]

All the above remarks indicate that, for Kant, the crucial thing about painting is its self-containment. It is this property which ensures it as a site of disinterest: enjoyment of painting is deemed not to lead on to anything else. Therefore nothing with a function, a goal, or a social purpose is deemed to be truly beautiful. To "use" beauty for rhetorical persuasion, sexual seduction or bodily adornment is to distract from its strict essence. Significantly, the deployment of dècor on the human body in the mode of tattooing is deemed especially reprehensible, and a mark of merely primitive humanity.[85] For here innately estimable design is grossly deployed (as Kant sees it) sexually to attract or to establish social prestige.

The other face of self-containment is non-intrusiveness. What keeps itself to itself can be thoroughly surveyed by a totalising gaze, but it does not impose itself on the knowing subject. While that which is clearly delimited can be fully known, it also leaves the subject free to choose when to turn his attention towards it. Totalising theoretical grasp is therefore in a natural alliance with free spontaneity. And of all the arts, it is painting that most secures this alliance. Music, by contrast, is termed by Kant "less urbane", since its lesser circumscribability ensures that it constantly reaches the ears of those who do not wish to hear it.[86] He is especially disapproving of singing at private household prayers which imposes upon silent neighbours: instead of the contagion of liturgy Kant now recommends a private visual contemplation which has already attained to a premature perfect beatitude, and this, paradoxically, is now recommended as the perfect shared ritual. The

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emotion most in common, the most ineluctably to be affirmed by all, has become that which each individual can most discretely enjoy, with a selected object, choosing his moment. Kant clearly feels that his contemporaries are close to sharing this view, since the habit of pulling perfumed handkerchiefs out of pockets which "gives a treat to all around whether they like it or not and compels them, if they want to breathe at all, to be parties to the enjoyment",[87] has gone out of fashion. Odours, like sounds, are far too anarchically disseminative, and unlike sounds, they admit no objective coded ordering into formed designs. Hence smelling, like eating, remains merely a matter of "taste", beyond any grounds upon which one should expect to elicit consent to one's feelings from another. Perhaps it appeared tiresome and unfortunate to Kant that just those sensations which cannot be avoided, and which leave us most at the mercy of others (for example cooks), are least subject to common jurisdiction, while those we are most free to select and attend to at will on occasions of leisure only, are the most consensual. On the other hand, perhaps not: perhaps this circumstance was seen as ensuring that only a civilised and bourgeois elite establish the true basis of association, beyond the prejudices of individual senses and common tradition.

Painting, therefore, is exemplary for Kant, because it establishes the strongest instance in which taste becomes objective and rational, and therefore passes over into the aesthetic. It is, indeed, a matter, as Derrida puts it, of establishing "the truth in painting", since, as we shall see, Kant's determination of the beautiful is essential to the completion of his project of establishing limits for the understanding, or bounds within which theoretical truth alone applies. If the beautiful alone, in its distinction from the sublime, finally draws a border round the phenomenal, this is one and the same with that "appropriate" frame one can supposedly affix to a painting depicting a main theme, since it is clear that the instance of the painting most reveals to us the beautiful.

So might not the Kantian insistence that phenomena manifest nothing of things-in-themselves, be a consequence of thinking of the world in its comprehensibility as like a painting, whose two-dimensionality prevents us from expecting any continuity between surface and what lies behind? For by contrast sculpture, in its three-dimensionality (like natural objects), forces us mentally to construct hidden faces in continuity with what we see if we are to get the sense of a discrete object at all. Finally, would not the Kantian critical project, if linked in this way to painting understood as a supremely "disinterested" art, itself reduce to a mere expression of that aesthetic which has replaced appropriate and occasional visual art-works *in situ* with "exhibits" lined upon the indifferent walls of a gallery?[88] If this is the case, it will also follow that the freedom to gaze at or to look away from a painting is at least one fundamental root for Kant's comprehension of freedom as such, since it is precisely the restriction of the understanding to the categorical schematisation of intutions which inversely preserves freedom from any essential involvement with intuitions—which is to say, any specific destiny.

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11. Disinterest as Theoretical Violence

But just how is it that the disinterested spectator of a painting is the Kantian theoretical subject? It has to do with the fact that Kant's transcendental deduction of beauty is in fact required in order to complete his transcendental deduction of theoretical reason in the *First Critique*.

In that deduction, what is at issue is how the categories of understanding can legitimately be made to apply to sensible appearances. The (obscure) answer given, is that categories may rightly be schematised in order to apply to appearances, because only in this way can we understand how appearances are appearances of objects, of specific things which stand out discretely from the temporal flux. This contention assumes that an object is to be correlated with the free, spontaneous attention of the subject, and hence with the transcendentally apperceived knower.[89]

As this answer stands, it appears both incomplete and too complete. Incomplete, since what legitimates the free seizure of objects from the flux of phenomena? Too complete, since if objects are deducible from knowing subjects, and the phenomenal is only ever manifest to us via objectivity, the phenomenal itself may be but a positing of the knowing subject, without any independent ontological standing. This was precisely the cue taken up by Fichte.

It is here that the transcendental deduction of beauty comes to the rescue. The new deduction reveals that reason does not, after all, alone provide all the conditions for the cooperation of the lesser faculties with its own activity. Instead, the *Third Critique's* notion of an *a priori* harmonisation of the faculties dethrones reason taken as the pure power of free subjectivity. This harmonisation is in turn grounded in a supersensible harmonisation of freedom with nature. Thus human reason, which does not have the power to create natural existence, here divides the kingdom with a self-standing phenomenal realm. However, this does not mean that there are reciprocal real relations between reason and nature, as in the classic psychic tradition. Were this the case, then a real ontological *convenientia* or *proportio* between knowing and being would obviate any need for an a priori co-ordination of the rational and sensitive faculties. Yet given the anchoring of the latter in a phenomenal source not derivable from our reason, and given the lack of any real relation of reason to this source, whereby in thinking it, it would psychically realise it according to its own destiny (the very lack which renders the source only phenomenal and not ontological), it would appear that nature and cognition are in some sort of pre-established harmony—for all that Kant denies this. Pre-establishment is the barren tribute of rationalism to the shade of reciprocal interaction. Moreover, even within this pre-establishment, there is no real reciprocity. Reason and imagination are not on a level: instead, the deduction of the beautiful involves a subsumption, such that "the power of intuition [is brought under] the power

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of concepts, in so far as the imagination in its freedom harmonises with the understanding in its lawfulness."[90]

The *Third Critique*, therefore, is not simply dealing with aesthetic judgement. Rather, it is dealing with judgement as such, and providing a deeper account of how the mind isolates objects from the flux of appearances.[91] The theoretical subsumption of intuitions under categories of the understanding itself involves the recognition of discrete objects unifying various intuitions, and this capacity is exercised by a judgement that operates a free play between the general organising capacity of thought and the general envisaging power of the imagination. The experience of the art-object or natural scene merely triggers a sense of this co-ordinating power, which we experience as the feeling of beauty (no intrinsic beauty being ascribed to any object). But how do we isolate any object, including those that we find especially beautiful?

At this point the notion of the sublime comes back into consideration. For Kant, the sublime concerns time before space, since anything spatially immense can be superseded, but we can never synthesise an infinite time-series. But this upsets the idea that the sublime lies simply beyond the furthest margin. For since time is truly endless and ungraspable, it seems that we should always await the next instance of the unfolding of temporal moments before reaching a final verdict upon anything. Therefore the sublime limit is encountered not at the edge, but within the midst, threatening all conceptuality. Kant admits this, when he declares in "The Analytic of the Sublime" in the *Third Critique* that "the comprehension of the manifold in the unity, not of thought, but of intuition, and consequently the comprehension of the successively apprehended parts at one glance, is a retrogression that removes the time-condition in the progression of the imagination, and renders co-existence intuitable".[92] Thus the deployment of the imagination by judgement/schematisation turns out to involve always an arbitrary delimitation of a certain imaginative unity. One is left to infer that the imaginatively perceived unity of a beautiful object is not only a subsumption of the sensible under "free laws", but in its ultimate delimitation and relationship to everything else, actually the imposition of an entirely random shape. Furthermore, since theoretical understanding also involves the mediation of the forms of sensibility, here too the exact portion of space attended to must be shaped by an arbitrary stoppage of the time-flow. Even in the case of theoretical reason, one must deduce that there is somehow involved a prior, freely judged selection of a "beautiful"—reasonably coherent—range of phenomena (although we may not be directly conscious of this) and yet this selection must be in turn an arbitrary suppression of the sublime. But from this inference it follows (as Jean-Luc Nancy and Howard Caygill have variously suggested)[93] that the "frame" (like a picture-frame) or boundary around a beautiful object (rendering it discrete and surveyable, as will be recalled) is actually none other than the brink on the edge of the sublime abyss. Thus what defines the beautiful is that boundary-fading-to-the-infinite

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of the sublime, which in time one might endlessly further re-define (only passing over at the point of transition to the noumenal), such that the experience of the aesthetic sublime is always had at a place of purely conventional stoppage. This same arbitrary stoppage alone establishes the beautiful experience, and within the range of this experience of the beautiful, the very possibility of theoretical understanding. We have already seen that in the general aesthetic co-ordination of the faculties, reason still rules the understanding, which in turn rules the imagination and sensibility. But now we see that this ruling and general subsumption must logically be arbitrary and violent in character. And Kant explicitly recognises this—"since the time-series is a condition of the internal sense and of an intuition, it is a subjective movement of the imagination by which it does violence to the internal sense—a violence which must be proportionately more striking the greater the quantum which the imagination comprehends in one intuition."[94] Since, for Kant, time is only imagined, and yet imagination as such does violence to time, it follows that we encounter time always through the contradictory extremity of the sublime as something which appears only in self-denial—just as, to dwell undying in the abyss, we must still hover on its brink.

In this way the disinterested subject of aesthetic judgement who is removed from reciprocity to the free private gaze upon a discrete object with which he is in no real psychic relation, is also the Kantian theoretical subject. Likewise, the governing of the entire critical philosophy by the unmediated and non-reciprocating dualism of the sublime and the beautiful, ensures that disinterested and objective understanding is equally a random and unobjective seizure. Without an assumed ontological *proportio* between all beings, private capture defines even the theoretic gaze.

NOTES

1 The present chapter is indebted to Paul Morris, of Victoria University, Wellington, who first suggested to me, when we were both at Lancaster University, that I needed to develop an account of the soul. For Descartes and scholasticism, see J.-F. Courtine, *Suarez et le Systeme de la Metaphysique* (Paris: PUF, 1990); Jean-Luc Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism: The Constitution and the Limits of Onto-Theo-Logy in Cartesian Thought* trans. Jeffrey L. Kossky (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999). For Descartes on the soul, see "Second Meditation" in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol II* ed John Cottingham *et al.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 17. See also the Fifth and Sixth Meditations. For the new notion of an "idea" in Descartes, see in addition Jean-Luc Marion, "What is the Method in the Metaphysics? The Role of the Simple Natures in the Meditations" in *Cartesian Questions* trans. Daniel Gerber (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 43–67.

2 See sections 14 to 15 below.

3 Augustine, *De Quantitate Animae: The Measure of the Soul*, trans Francis E Tourscher (Philadelphia, PA: Peter Reilly, 1933) Chaps 11, pp. 51–52; 12, pp. 52–53; 14, pp. 60–69; 17, pp. 76–81.

4 See *De Musica*, Book VI, and Catherine Pickstock, "Music: Soul, City and Cosmos" in *Radical Orthodoxy* edited by J. Milbank, C. Pickstock and G. Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 243–277.

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5 On *Convenientia*, see Gilbert Narcisse, OP, *Les Raisons de Dieu: Arguments de Convenance et Esthetique Theologique Selon St Thomas d'Aquin et Hans Urs von Balthasar* (Fribourg: Editions Fribourg Suisse, 1997), esp. pp. 165–180.

6 René Descartes, "The Passions of the Soul", in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol I*, trans J. Cottingham *et al.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For the soul as no longer principle of motion, see Part One, 5 p. 343; Part Two, 52 p. 349 and pp. 53–148. Even wonder is seen as functional, and a non-functional excess of wonder as simply dangerous, and to be curbed by reason: pp. 75–78. A true soul, nevertheless, remains in Descartes to the extent that he believes there is a mysterious mediation between soul and body, and no outright dualism. See Part One, pp. 30–35. See also Henri Gouhier, *Les Premières Pensées de Descartes: Contribution à l'Histoire de l'Anti-Renaissance* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958).

7 See Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (London: Penguin, 1991) esp. pp. 101–138, and 430 and also the references in note 8, below. For a useful defence of the irreducibility of mind, see Colin McGinn, *The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999). McGinn is especially good in arguing that no physical process or patterning, even in a computer, ever amounts to "thought" or "sign", without interpretation and reflexivity, which are unthinkable outside phenomenological awareness.

8 See, for example, John R. Searle, "How to study consciousness scientifically", in *Consciousness and Human Identity* edited by John Cornwell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Gerald M. Edelman and Guilio Tononi "Neural Darwinism: the Brain as a Selectional System" in *Nature's Imagination: the Frontiers of Scientific Vision*, edited by John Cornwell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

9 Plato, *Sophist* 247 C-E.

10 This seems to be Dennett's view.

11 For "inter-monadic phenomenology", see Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorian Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), Fifth Meditation, Paras 42–62, pp. 89–151; *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

12 Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Defn I and Prop XXIV. Spinoza's very first statement in the *Ethics* interprets the situation where essence implies existence, as involving self-causation. This interpretation (which contrasts with pre-Cartesian ones which did not allow self-causation), implies that essence has priority over existence as supreme and infinite cause. See J-L Marion, *On Descartes's Metaphysical Prism*, pp. 348–349.

13 J. H. Jacobi, "Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza" in *The Main Philosophical Writings*, trans. George di Giovanni (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), esp. p. 190.

14 See Jean-Luc Marion, "The Essential Incoherence of Descartes' Definition of Divinity", in *Essays on Descartes' Meditations* edited by A. O. Rorty (Berkeley, CA: California University Press, 1986), pp. 297–338.

15 I am indebted here to conversations with David Burrell, regarding Eckhart's insistence that a true Creator cannot be just "other" to the world.

16 See especially, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Scizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley et al (London: Athlone, 1993).

17 See sections 8 and 9 below.

18 Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) *passim*. See also, Phillip Blond, "Emmanuel Levinas: God and Phenomenology", in *Post-Secular Philosophy*, edited by Phillip Blond (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 208–228. The present article is much indebted to conversations with this author over the past decade.

19 Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics", in *Writing and Difference* trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 79–53 and Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 335–341, 354–355.

20 Emmanuel Levinas, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge", in *The Levinas Reader* edited by Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 59–75. For the *Il y a*, see Emmanuel Levinas, "There is: Existence without Existents" in *The Levinas Reader*, pp. 29–37. Here there is a nothingness at the very heart of being, and also a pure nothing of consciousness which does not limit or end being, but "interrupts" it. Yet it can seem as if these two nullities are not altogether distinct, since the "infinite" of the pure nullity is also the "in-finite" of the impure nothing that is also being and the "finite" *Il y a*. The pure nothingness becomes

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elsewhere a "trace" of the beyond-being (Plotinus' One beyond being is explicitly invoked) that does not, however, image an origin. See "The Trace of the Other", trans. Alphonso Lingis in *Deconstruction in Context*, edited by Mark C. Taylor (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 345–359.

21 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, pp. 188ff.

22 Ricoeur, pp. 201–239.

23 See Catherine Pickstock, *After Writing: On The Liturgical Consumation of Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 135–158.

24 Thomas Aquinas, *ST* II II Q.26, "The Order of Priorities in Charity", and Q.27 a3. Aquinas can be read as proposing "asymmetrical reciprocity", since while at Q.27 all he argues that it more belongs to charity to love than to be loved, at a2 he states that charity surpasses goodwill, because whereas the latter "makes us wish another well, without presupposing any union", charity "implies a certain affective union between lover and loved, inasmuch as the lover, seeing the beloved as one with himself or part of him, is thereby attracted".

25 Jean-Luc Marion, *Étant Donnée: Essai d'une Phenomenologie de la Donation* (Paris: PUF, 1997), p. 119. For an earlier version of the "gift" section of this book in English, see "Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of Gift", in *Postmodern Philosophy and Christian Thought*, edited by Merold Westphal (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999). Levinas already insisted that gratitude or its anticipation contaminated the purity of the gift. See "The Trace of the Other", p. 349: "radical generosity requires an ingratitude of the other".

26 Marion, *Étant Donnée*, pp. 13–169.

27 *Étant Donnée*, esp. pp. 316–317; see also pp. 265–280. The reason why the saturated phenomenon is now "typical" is that here alone do we intimate our entire givenness as subject in encountering that which arrives before us and delivers us. But Marion here assumes that all knowledge must be "led back" to the foundation of that which ineluctably appears. Hence all speculative or intimative relation to what delivers us is ruled out. However, it is then dogmatic to claim that the originating donation does appear to us in the form of a blinding experience. All Marion's instances of such experiences conceal the fact that the isolation of the "purely" overwhelming from the relatively formed, anticipated and horizoned, is an act of interpretation, just like Kant's questionable sundering of the sublime from the beautiful. Moreover, Marion's account of traditional philosophy as tied to a typical phenomenon "poor" in intuition, seems not entirely accurate. He is thinking of the normativity of mathematical knowledge. However, while the element of sensory intuition in, say, geometry as traditionally understood was thin, in that it regarded only the abstract surface of the world, nonetheless it was regarded as uniquely transparent to, and almost coinciding with, intellectual intuition. Thus it was not so much that intuition (both sensory and intellectual) was "poor" here, but rather perfect—that is to say, perfectly commensurate with its object, like divine intuition. However, if it was perfect, it was also very restricted, which is a different thing from poor. (It is not that there is lack—*penia*—of intuition, but that the intuition lacks in scope.) Outside this mathematical range, human intuition was vaguer, in the sense that sensory sight was accompanied by less intellectual insight. Yet Marion seems to confuse "rich" in intuition with just this vagueness, which reaches an extreme pitch in saturation. Surely, though, the divine intuition is not vague! And if our intuition, at its most intuitive, is vague, then it would seem all the more removed from divine, archetypal, intellectual intuition. Thus the upshot would be that Marion ironically downgrades intellectual intuition, which is phenomenology's core. Such an upshot appears confirmed when he later confines human (specifically intellectual) responses to interpretation and willing. See later in the main text.

28 *Étant Donnée*, pp. 136–147.

29 Soren Kierkegaard, *Works of Love* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 317–330.

30 *Étant Donnée*, pp. 155–161, 390–396.

31 *Étant Donnée*, pp. 396–408.

32 *Étant Donnée*, p. 364. On "active reception", see Catherine Pickstock, *loc cit*. and John Milbank, "The Force of Identity" in *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 194–219. This model applies also to our reception of God—indeed applies here most of all—even though, in this case of course, there is no question of our exerting a counter-influence; it is rather that we only exist as actively returning to God. This is not, however, at all to disagree with Marion's excellent analysis of *Capax Dei*, and

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his demonstration that the idea that if we are "capable" of something, then we must have an autonomous active power (*posse*) to accomplish it, belongs to the theology of pure nature and a duality of natural and supernatural ends (unknown to Aquinas and Scotus) in Suarez, Baius and Descartes. (See Marion, *Cartesian Questions*, chapter four, "What is the Ego Capable of", pp. 67–96.) The point rather is that God, in fulfilling "our own" capacity which paradoxically we cannot of ourselves fulfil (our nature only completable in our supernatural destiny) nonetheless gives us an active *posse* to go beyond ourselves. In Augustine this *posse* accompanies an ecstatic desire and an over-reaching knowledge—as Marion seems not to mention. See for example, *Civitas Dei*, XI, 25–26.

33 See Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 17–22.

34 *Étant Donnée*, pp. 259–262, 280–296.

35 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) Part One, Division One, VI, pp. 225–274; Division Two, IV. 71, pp. 421–424.

36 Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 21: "For us [in contrast to Husserl] phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, to the understanding of the being of the being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed)". See also, Michel Henry, "The Critique of the Subject" in *Who Comes After the Subject*? Edited by E. Cadova *et al.* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 157–166 esp. pp. 162–163. Henry brilliantly points out that Heidegger is twice trapped inside the representing subject: once, because he still claims to represent the disclosure of Being as such, and twice, because this Being is disclosed in the history of Being, which is the fall of Being into exteriority, where knowledge is reduced to the representation of objects by subjects in the finite world. Since, then, epistemology and its accompanying regime of technology is fated, epistemology (and technology) is the real truth of Being for Heidegger—while inversely, Being is still disclosed within an epistemological framework.

37 *Étant Donnée*, pp. 319–325. Nevertheless, Marion understands the experience of the idol also as one of *éblouissement*, rather than attention to form, even though the idol "stops" our gaze, like a mirror consigning us to solipsism, rather than allowing the gaze to pass through the image, as in the case of the icon.

38 *Étant Donnée*, pp. 95–96.

39 *Étant Donnée*, pp. 321–322, 406–408. Marion's view that difference/deferring in Levinas and Derrida is only tied to time, whereas his deferral is intrinsic to donation as such (so more absolutely displacing ontic presence), seems questionable at least in the case of Derrida, who considers that meaning as such involves deferral, since it is tied to signs. For Merleau-Ponty's account, see sections 12 to 14 below. And for Michel Henry, see his *Phénoménologie Matérielle* (Paris: PUF, 1990) and "The Critique of the Subject", in *Who Comes After the Subject?* pp. 157–167. Henry seeks to build on the *epoché* of the passions exercised by Descartes at *Passions of the Soul* 26: we still feel even when we dream and represent nothing. At the same time he wishes to deny the Cartesian view that passions are normally disturbances of the soul from without (and so related to functionality). The notion of "auto-affection" then ensues. This is an immediacy without difference that constitutes the subject and is unrelated to any exterior—p. 161: "submission that is no longer submission to some other reality, to an exteriority, that is the submission of and to itself—feeling". It is the precondition for "letting appearance appear", and "making be everything that is" (p. 165) As such, auto-affection is Being itself, that lets Being be: "the Being of all being that subsists, that still is, after the reduction". Henry's claim is that reduction to auto-affection for the first time gives us the cogito, and the philosophy of the subject. Descartes and Kant (though the former was closer) failed to grasp it, since the subject of representation can only be talked about in terms of representable objects. As unrepresentable and empty, this representing subject is therefore already implicitly the deconstructed post-subject! But all this ingenuity will not conceal the glaring truth: Henry perpetuates an unjustifiable Cartesian dualism. For first, there is no immediacy in auto-affection, as Wittgenstein showed. Even in feeling we are distanced from ourselves, and must represent ourselves to ourselves symbolically (there is no unspoken pain). Secondly, as Merleau-Ponty showed, the self-affecting of the body reveals, with co-originality, a reflexivity of the world: we

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affect ourselves only in so far as we grasp things affecting themselves through us and through other human bodies. (See n.46 below, and sections 12–14 in the main text.)

In addition, see Michel Henry, *C'est Moi la Verité: Pour une Philosophie du Christianisme* (Paris: Seuil, 1996) and "Parole et Religion: Parole de Dieu", in *Phenoménologie et Théologie* edited by J.-F. Courtine (Paris: Criterion, 1992), pp. 129–160. In these places, Henry suggests that the Christian revelation confirms auto-affection as grounded in an auto-utterance that gives to us this self-giving. Revelation therefore shows to us the "immemorable" that nonetheless cannot be forgotten—the very life of our body, which we can only live freely and smoothly when we lose consciousness that we have a body. Much in this position is profound, yet the forgotten/unforgettable body need not be seen as solipsistic in its preconsciousness. And while the Word of revelation, unlike our words, indeed gives life, this is not because it fails to signify and differ—indeed the Word of the Son is the Being of the Father in signifying difference. It is rather that the generation, the externalisation and rendering visible of the *Logos* is also the generation of life, of the Son. So life is not here juxtaposed, as with Henry, to language, visibility and being.

40 Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, pp. 63–64: "I cannot and must not ask how the inner intentional comportment itself arrives at an outside. I cannot and must not put the question in that way, because intentional comportment as such orients itself towards the extant … it is precisely intentionality and nothing else in which transcendence consists." Heidegger goes on to say that intentionality is not within the ego, but constitutes it. Here his scholastic background distances him from Husserl.

41 Edmund Husserl, *Ideas I*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), section 90. For a precise grasp of the difference between Husserlian and Augustinian intentionality, see Jacques Maritain, *Distinguish to Unite*, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), pp. 109–110. Maritain also suggests (p. 109, n.77) that phenomenology "depends" on Duns Scotus's theory of ideas and of *esse objectivum*. And see Dermot Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 157.

42 *Étant Donnée*, p. 32. See also John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, *Truth in Aquinas* (London: Routledge, 2000), Chapter Two, "Truth and Vision".

43 For the evolution of metaphysics, see Courtine, *op. cit.*, pp. 482–495. Here, Courtine concludes that Suarez's "being" which is grasped independently of theology—and so univocally —evolves into the "objectness" (*objectité*) of a precisely measurable entity, in Descartes' *Regulae ad Directionem Humani Ingenii*. The latter gives in effect his "general metaphysics" (now evolved into a *mathesis*), whereas the *Meditations* gives his "special metaphysics", which concerns not being as such but the highest being (God) and souls (as measured immeasurably by us) and material beings (as precisely measured by us). Marion somewhat demurs, but also sees the *Regulae* as setting out the elements of a new sort of ontology, in terms of "common notions": see *Cartesian Questions*, Chapter Three, "What is the Method in the Metaphysics?".

For the will as nullifying in Scotus and Ockham, see Marilyn McCord Adams, "Ockham on Will, Nature and Morality", in *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, edited by Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 245–273. For will in Descartes, see "Fourth Meditation" in *The Philosophical Writings Vol II*, pp. 39–43.

44 Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy", Third Meditation, 45, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol II*, p. 31 and Fourth Meditation, pp. 39–43. Here Descartes refuses the scholastic view that the forms of things can be contained in thinking mind, but says that "it seems possible" that the "modes" of material substance are "eminently contained" within mind, on the basis of a generic "substantiality" between extended and unextended reality. As to Descartes and univocity, it is true that he (unusually for this date) denies that there are shared universal essences between God and Creation. However, this does not amount to a denial of a shared univocity of being. Univocity of being seems manifest in Descartes in three ways: 1. In the *Regulae* he defines *ens* as knowable object without reference to God, and so without reference to the participation of beings in Being, whereby they only "are" by analogy. 2. The doctrine of God as *causa sui* assumes that every being (including God taken as merely a being), must have a "preceding" cause. Even if Descartes conceded, when pressed, that God as preceding formal cause is only "analogously" like a preceding finite efficient cause, he is still in effect thinking of "preceding" as a universally shared property, and thereby diluting the divine simplicity. 3. The infinity and

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"indifference" of the human will renders it univocally similar to the divine will. This holds, even though Descartes insists on a non-univocal disparity between human and divine modes of indifference—human will is only indifferent when it perversely exceeds the scope of reason, which naturally it should obey. Divine will is absolutely indifferent, since (for Descartes' extreme voluntarism), it precedes the norms of reason which it creates. However, (a) this still accords an ontologically original indifference to the human will, univocally like God's, which allows it to go astray, whereas for Augustine and Aquinas, the going astray of the will was more emphatically a privation of willing and of will as such; (b) the absolute indifference of the divine will prior to reason is itself related to the univocal principle of *causa sui*, and likewise compromises the divine simplicity which is the real basis for non-univocal predication in naming God. Both Jean-Luc Marion and Vincent Carraud tend to downplay the degree to which Descartes' voluntarism is as culpable of ontotheology as Spinoza and Leibniz's intellectualism. A hypostasisation of *potentia absoluta* is no true apophasis. See Descartes, "Meditations", Fourth Meditation, *Philosophical Writings Vol II*, pp. 37–43; "Sixth Set of Replies", pp. 291–292; Vincent Carraud, "Descartes", in *Dictionnaire Critique de Theologie* edited by Jean-Yves Lacoste (Paris: PUF, 1998), p. 4. The "Cartesian circle" is also an ontotheological circle tied to univocity. The idea of God confirms the real ontological status of certain things clearly and distinctly perceived, yet the idea of God as the infinite which we absolutely cannot have invented, and which we know positively with logical priority to our knowledge of finitude, is the prime example of a clear and distinct idea. Even though we do not "grasp" the idea of God, clarity and distinctness still operate a universal criterion.

45 Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences*, *passim*.

46 I am indebted here to discussions with Augustine Thompson OP of the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia, concerning Abelard and nominalism. On Locke, see John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* edited by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) Book II, Chap VIII, paras 7–8, p. 134; Michael Ayers, *Locke: Ideas and Things* (London: Phoenix, 1977), pp. 10–23; Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), pp. 45–51, 136–137. On Reid, see Rorty, pp. 142–143. On Berkeley, see John Milbank, *The Word Made Strange* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 97–105. The reason why Rorty (in his wonderful and epoch-making book) prefers Reid's "direct realism" to Aristotle's "knowledge by identity" seems to be that, in part, he misdescribes the relation of soul to body in Aristotle, and then in scholasticism, following Wallace Matson. Thus while, indeed, sensations and feelings are "inside" the mind for Descartes, Locke and Kant, in a way that they were not for ancient and mediaeval tradition (though the Stoics, as Rorty notes, may be exceptions), this does not mean that in Aristotle sensation is purely bodily and materialistic. To the contrary, for him there is no dualism, and no ensuing problem of "representation", not only because he is naturalistic (as Rorty sees it), but also because he is idealistic even about matter. Material substances are themselves "meanings" (*eide*), and where they can move or sense they already have *psyche*. In human beings, *psyche* does not, indeed, "receive" sensations inside itself, but it is itself present at the surface of sensing. While, indeed, the power of *psyche* as *nous* is more abstracting and universalising, by virtue of its immateriality, no obscure "mirroring in a glassy essence" is involved here (as if this were a proto-Cartesianism, as Rorty seems to imply). Instead, the initial reflexivity of *sensus communis* already reconstitutes the *eide* in their significant integrity, and this "common" capacity already implies an intellectual grasp of the ineffable "proportion" between different sensations, and between the materialised form and the form as understood (and we never encounter anything outside this proportion). The "universal" and the "abstract" do not intrude upon a pragmatic world that makes perfect sense in its own terms: to the contrary, every motion and sensation turns out already to assume such abstractability and universalisability. We only touch and know forms, as things removable from their specific instances: in this theoretical remove, practice is grounded (see further, sections 12–14 below). In following the Reidian option of direct presence of mind to material realities without abstractive migration of form (though this is compatible with Aristotle to the degree that, for him, forms do not really migrate to *psyche* as an inner space, since his *psyche* as "in a manner all things", is in a manner "everywhere"), Rorty appears, in effect, to dispense with mind altogether. But then he is stuck with Dennett's problems concerning the genesis of the epiphenomenal illusion

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of subjective awareness: Rorty's hermeneutic playground within the real hard school of firing neurons. (The reader may notice that I have slightly revised my attitudes to Aristotle and Reid on knowing compared with previous publications.)

47 For this section, see Jean-Luc Marion, "Does the Cogito affect itself? Generosity and Phenomenology: Remarks on Michel Henry's Interpretation", and "Does the ego alter the Other?", in *Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 96–118 and 138; Michel Henry, *C'est Moi la Verite*; Descartes, "Meditations" in *The Philosophical Writings Vol. II*, Fourth Meditation, 57, pp. 39–40; "Passions of the Soul" in *The Philosophical Writings Vol. I*, paragraphs 41, 51–54, 91, 147, 149–158, 161, 190, 193; Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), §§293–304. On the sublime in seventeenth century France, see Marc Fumaroli, *l'Age de l'Eloquence* (Geneva: Droz, 1980) esp. pp. 279–343 and Debora K. Shuger, *Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), *passim*.

48 Alain Renaut, *The Era of the Individual: A Contribution to the History of Subjectivity*, trans. M. B. DeBevoise and Franklin Philip (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), esp. pp. 167–201. Renaut attempts to finitise Kant's ethics, and reduce his invocation of the infinite to a regulative norm, by arguing, in the wake of Luc Ferry, that Kant, in sections 76 and 77 of *The Critique of Judgement*, declares that we can only invoke the infinite improperly in terms of purpose and end, whereas a true infinite would be (incomprehensibly, Renaut implies) beyond either. But this ignores the fact that even the noumenal moral law, which is at least somewhat accessible to us, is for Kant concerned with forms beyond ends. Teleology in Kant is, indeed, also for the infinite, a secondary matter of orientating the purposive and eudaemonistic towards the pure formal self-sustaining of freedom.

49 See Graham Priest, *Beyond the Limits of Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

50 See J.-F. Courtine, *op. cit.*, pp. 521–538.

51 I have argued this in "A Critique of the Theology of Right", in *The Word Made Strange*, pp. 7–36.

52 See, again, Milbank, *The Word Made Strange*, pp. 97–105.

53 *Étant Donnée*, pp. 103–108, 323–235.

54 See John Montag, SJ, "Revelation: the False Legacy of Suarez" in *Radical Orthodoxy*, pp. 38–64, and Courtine, *Suarez et le Systeme*, pp. 199–201.

55 *Étant Donnée*, pp. 225–44.

56 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord, Vol V: The Realm of Metaphysics in the Modern Age*, trans. Oliver Davies *et al.* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), pp. 119–132.

57 Francois de Salignac de la Mothe Fènelon, *Oeuvres Spirituelles*, introd. Francois Varillon (Paris: Aubier, 1954), p. 248. See also pp. 237–258.

58 Fènelon, "Dialogues sur L'Eloquence" in *Oeuvres Choisies*, Tome II (Paris: Hachette, 1879), p. 286.

59 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, paras 4 and 6; *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 128–129.

60 Kant, *Opus Postumum*, trans. E. Forster and M. Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 219–223.

61 Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), "The Doctrine of Virtue", II-IX, pp. 187–188. It will be apparent to the reader that I am unimpressed by the attempts of Onora O'Neill *et al.* to read Kant as "a modern virtue ethicist"— there can be no such thing.

62 *The Metaphysics of Morals*, "The Doctrine of Virtue", V 3 p. 192; VII 2 pp. 196–197.

63 *op. cit.* "The Doctrine of Virtue", Introduction, p. 185.

64 *Groundwork*, p. 129.

65 *Critique of Judgement*, para 28.

66 *loc. cit*.

67 *Groundwork*, p. 128.

68 It was this complication in Kant which largely inspired the "Davos" debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer, with Heidegger upholding feelings and finitude in Kant's ethics, and Cassirer upholding disinterested reason and noumenal infinitude. They were both right, as Alain Renaut well concludes in *The Era of the Individual loc. cit*.

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69 *Groundwork*, p. 128.
70 *Critique of Practical Reason*, Book I, Chapter I, pp. 43–52.
71 *Critique of Pure Reason* A745/B773; A820/B848–A381/B859.
72 *Critique of Practical Reason*, Part I, Book I, I p. 48.
73 Kant, "The End of all Things", in *Religion and Rational Theology*, trans. A. W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 221–231; *Critique of Pure Reason* A 826/B854–A827/B855; *Critique of Practical Reason*, Book II, chaps II, IV and V, pp. 128–132.
74 "Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason", in *Religion and Rational Theology*, pp. 69–125.
75 *Critique of Judgement*, para 28.
76 *op cit* para 29. See also, Jean-Luc Nancy, "L'Offrande Sublime", in *Du Sublime*, edited by J-F Courtine (Paris: Belin, 1988), pp. 37–77.
77 *Critique of Judgement*, paras 9, 25, 30, 41, 42.
78 *op. cit.* para 53.
79 *op. cit.* para 14.
80 *loc. cit.*
81 *loc. cit.*
82 Jacques Derrida, "Parergon" in *La Verité en Peinture* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), pp. 44–95.
83 *Critique of Judgement*, paras 14, 17.
84 *op. cit.* para 51.
85 *op. cit.* para 41.
86 *op. cit.* para 53.
87 *loc. cit.*
88 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. William Glen-Doepel (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), pp. 119–142.
89 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 129–A130; B159–161; 166–169.
90 *Critique of Judgement* para 40.
91 *op. cit.* Preface. Here it is said that the "power of judgement" equals "sound understanding", and is "universally and necessarily required". However, its principle "cannot be derived from a priori concepts". Therefore, "the concept of judgement only serves as a rule for the principle of judgement itself", but not as "an objective rule which would judge judgement, since this would lead to an infinite regress". Then perplexity concerning this principle "arises mainly" (but therefore not exclusively) in aesthetic judgements.
92 *op. cit.* para 27.
93 Nancy, *loc. cit*; Howard Caygill, *Art of Judgement* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 284–393.
94 *Critique of Judgement*, para 27. And see Jacob Rogozinski, "Le Don du Monde", in *Du Sublime*, pp. 179–211.

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