Is Intelligent Design 'Scientific'?
Loren Haarsma, Assistant Professor of Physics and Astronomy
Minds in the Making

Editor's note: This handout was distributed at the author's presentation to"Models for Creation: Intelligent Design and Evolution," the annual conference of the American Scientific Affiliation, at Messiah College in Grantham, Penn., in August 2005. The full text of the author's presentation is also available.

A.   The majority of modern arguments for Intelligent Design (ID) fall into one of these categories:

(A1) That biological complexity (the development of first life, plus some subsequent increases in complexity during biological history) cannot be explained via natural evolutionary mechanisms alone.   Some attempts are made to formalize this claim via probability arguments.   (Controversial.)

(A2) That the fundamental laws of nature appear to be finely tuned for life.   This argument is often left as an intuitive appeal without formal probability calculations.   (Fairly uncontroversial among theists.)

B.   A broad picture of science includes:

(B1) The basis for science:   Can we discover new truths about nature? If so, how and why are we able to do so?

(B2) The processes of science:   What are effective scientific methods for learning about nature?

(B3) The discoveries of science: What do we learn about nature when we apply these methods?

(B4) The inferences of science:   Do scientific discoveries have implications for society, philosophy, religion?

(B5) The human aspect of science:   What are our motives, ethics, and goals for doing science?

C.   A narrower picture of science restricts itself to questions B2 and B3, and it acknowledges the critical role in science of constructing and testing explanatory models which only refer to natural causes.   (This is not to claim that science must ever-and-always restrict itself to "naturalistic" models, it only notes that such models play a critical role in scientific progress.   Advocates of ID also construct and test such models as one step in their arguments.)

D.   There are varying degrees of success in building models for natural events.   Events could be:

(D1) Explainable.   Good empirical models predict that known natural mechanisms can explain the event.

(D2) Partially explainable.   Our empirical models are not sufficiently thorough to explain the event entirely.   However, based on what we know so far, we believe that known natural mechanisms are sufficient to account for the event.   We believe that future advances will allow us to explain the event fully.

(D3) Unexplainable.   No known natural mechanisms can explain this event.   In fact, there are good empirical reasons for ruling out any model which relies only on known natural mechanisms. ( eg . source of the Big Bang)

E.   Individual scientists often reach differing conclusions about the cause of a scientifically "unexplainable" event:

(E1) A currently unknown natural law is responsible for the event.

(E2) A supernatural event occurred.   (Caused by an intelligent being of a different reality than our universe.)

(E3) Super-human technology brought about the event.   (Caused by intelligent beings who are contained in and limited by our universe (or a parallel one very much like it), but with superior technology.)

(E4) A very improbable event simply happened.

(E5) There are many universes , and we just happen to live in one where this improbable event happened.

   For details, see Chapter 5 of   Perspectives on an Evolving Creation , K.B. Miller, ed.

F1.   Some arguments used by Intelligent Design advocates are definitely scientific, even under the narrow definition of science above.   Examples include: modeling of evolutionary population dynamics, investigating the adequacy of known evolutionary mechanisms to account for specific instances of biological complexity, and investigating the general conditions under which self-organized complexity is possible.

F2.   When arguing that some phenomenon belongs in category D3, it's important to be as thorough as possible in accounting for known natural processes.   For example, a simplistic model of evolution looks like this: the only mutations are point mutations; each gene produces a single protein; each protein has a single function; the only way to fix a mutation in a population is through natural selection.   A more thorough accounting of natural mechanisms includes: reproductive isolation, founder effects, neutral drift, sexual selection, environment-dependent gene expression, gene duplication, horizontal gene transfer, allopolyploidy, endosymbiont capture, differential RNA editing, ambiguous tRNA sequences, multiple proteins encoded by the same gene, multiple functions for a single protein, and others.   (See also Chapter 13 of   Perspectives on an Evolving Creation , K.B. Miller, ed.)   Failure to be thorough in accounting for known mechanisms is an easy way to construct flawed scientific arguments.  

F3.   Given how much we have yet to learn, two types of (restrained) scientific conclusions seem accessible to advocates of ID.   [1] Based on specific models with well-defined assumptions, we can rule out certain groups of natural mechanisms as being adequate by themselves to account for first life or specific examples of biological complexity.   Any evolutionary accounts will need to use additional natural mechanisms. ( e.g. " Simulating evolution by gene duplication...." Behe & Snoke, Protein Sci. 2004; 13:2651.)   [2] "It seems to me" (that is, it is my scientific intuition) that once all natural mechanisms are accounted for in detail, we'll be able to show that first life, or certain types of biological complexity ( e.g. bacteria flagella), are unexplainable in terms of known natural mechanisms.

Given how much we have yet to learn, two types of (restrained) scientific conclusions seem accessible to advocates of evolution.   [1] Using known natural mechanisms ( e.g. gene duplication), we can construct plausible models for certain specific examples of biological complexity ( e.g. certain ion channels).   [2] "It seems to me" (that is, it is my scientific intuition) that once all natural mechanisms are accounted for in detail, we'll be able to show that first life and all types of biological complexity can be explained in terms of known natural mechanisms.

G.   Some arguments for ID go beyond science and overlap into philosophy.   Examples include:

(G1) When we see an event which had a very low probability of happening and for which there could plausibly be a beneficiary, we generally conclude the event was planned and executed by an intelligent agent.

(G2) Taking into account various philosophical, historical, and religious arguments, the most likely explanation for the fine-tuning of natural laws is that they were supernaturally planned.

(G3) If we can show that first life / biological complexity is unexplainable (highly improbable) in terms of known natural mechanisms, we will have proven that it was brought about by an intelligent agent.

(G4) If we can show that first life / biological complexity is unexplainable (highly improbable) in terms of known natural mechanisms, then if we also take into account various philosophical, historical, and religious arguments, the most likely explanation is that it was brought about by supernatural action.

(G5) "Intelligent Design" is a very good term to associate (equate?) with the idea that biological complexity is unexplainable in terms of natural evolutionary mechanisms.

These are all worthy of being debated.   I believe that some are strong arguments, and some are flawed.

Some ID advocates would like to classify G3 under "science" rather than "philosophy."   G3 falls under science-defined-broadly, but it falls outside of science-defined-narrowly as most people understand it today.   Demarcation lines between science and philosophy have occasionally shifted in the past.   If biological complexity defies evolutionary explanation and if ID becomes a useful rubric for guiding empirical studies, then the demarcation of science will evolve to encompass ID.   My advice is: be patient.   If someone says that G3 is "not science," reply, "OK, call it philosophy if you want, but regardless of how you classify it, is the argument itself sound or unsound?"

Regarding G5: consider that the laws of nature are fine-tuned not only for the existence of, but also for the self-assembly of atoms, molecules, stars, and planets with oceans and atmospheres.   This is considered evidence for design.   If the laws of nature are also fine-tuned not only for the existence of, but also for the self-assembly of life and biological complexity, should this be considered evidence for, or against, design? Most ID-advocates essentially argue that if life and complexity can self-organize, then that should be counted as evidence against design.

H.   Some arguments for ID are religious.   Examples (paraphrased) would include:

(H1) Christians should embrace ID as a way to oppose atheism.

(H2) The "theistic" part   of "theistic evolution" is essentially meaningless.

(H3) Theistic evolution is dangerous to the Christian faith.

(H4) God definitely used (scientifically detectable) supernatural events to create biological complexity.

(H5) It is reasonable to believe that God might have used (scientifically unexplainable) supernatural events to create first life and biological complexity.

(H6) Good theology & hermeneutics should convince us that ID is more likely to be true than theistic evolution.

These are all worthy of being debated.   I believe that some are seriously flawed while others have merits.   I disagree with H6 but recommend it as a useful starting point for a friendly, spirited debate among Christian scholars.

I1.   To advocates of ID, I recommend:   Don't pretend that ID can be evaluated purely as science without consideration of religious implications; you aren't fooling anyone.   Don't try to be coy and say, "I don't know" or "it doesn't matter" when someone asks, "Who is the designer?"   Instead answer, "That is a philosophical and religious question and I'll be happy to give you my opinion and the reason for my beliefs; however, can we also debate the scientific questions as well?"   Instead of arguing that all of ID belongs under the definition of "science," embrace the distinctions among the scientific, philosophical, and religious portions of your arguments - as a way of making your critics more at ease - and ask that each portion be discussed in turn on its merits.

I2.   To opponents of ID, I recommend:   Don't play the demarcation game, that is, don't insist on definitions of science which try to exclude ID.   Don't insist that ID must posit a specific mechanism in order to be "scientific."   It is valid sometimes to test the validity of one scientific model without proposing an alternative, or to argue that an event belongs in category D3.     Don't try to trap ID-advocates by asking, "Who is the designer;" this is simply a way of shifting the debate from one level to another.   Instead: evaluate the scientific parts of ID on their scientific merits; evaluate the philosophical parts of ID on their merits; and evaluate the theological parts of ID on their merits.