Philosophy @ Calvin—lectures, news and events
Recent Lectures
Philosophy of Science, Faith, and Science Lectures, April 12-13, 2012
Abstract: A constructively critical discussion of the themes in Chapter Four of Plantinga's new book -- the "new picture" of a quantum world and how one might think of divine action in such a world.Dr. Hans Halvorson (Princeton)
"Divine Action in a Quantum World"
Audio of the event | Handouts from the event
Thursday, April 12, 2012
Abstract: We assume that in experimental physicists have freedom to prepare apparatus, choose initial conditions and repeat experiments at any particular instant. Is this assumption warranted? Suppose our best fundamental theories of physics are deterministic and strictly govern all matter and interaction. Then physicists do not exercise freedom in experiments. On the other hand, suppose our best fundamental theories of physics are interdeterministic and govern all matter and interactions. Then there would be no guarantee that physicists choices will be actualized in the material world nor seemingly any reason to think their actions are anything other than flukes resulting from interdeterministic physical events. First, I will diagnose this dilemma as depending on the assumption of the casual closure of physics (CoP) -- roughly, that all physical effects at time t are fully determined by fundamental laws and prior physical events. Then, I will offer reasons to think that CoP, at best, amounts to a typicality condition about what happens in the absence of nonphysical effects. If this line of thinking is right, then the laws of physics do not globally determine what physicists can or cannot do, but, rather, provide limits on the space of possibilities for their choices and actions.Dr. Robert Bishop (Wheaton)
"Free Will and the Causal Closure of Physics"
Audio of the event
Thursday, April 12, 2012
Abstract: Although much ink has been spilled over methodological naturalism (MN), there is a curious disconnect between discussions of MN and developments in philosophy of science. For example, MN is a general, methodological principle, meant to apply across all sciences (i.e., 'Science'), but general, methodological principles have largely been abandoned in philosophy of science. Additionally, philosophers of science do not appeal to MN to justify existing inferential practices in specific sciences. I argue that the concerns often collected underneath the label 'MN' (e.g., theoretical assumptions, explanatory standards, data gathering strictures, inter alia) take on their meaning and significance in concrete, circumscribed communities of empirical inquiry and cannot be understood apart from the conceptual content found in particular sciences (Brigandt, 2010). As a consequence, there is no meaningful sense in which MN is a global characteristic of Science; there are only 'local' MNs in different sciences. This reconceptualization of MN appears to eliminate some of the standard functions that a 'global' MN serves, such as generally demarcating scientific and religious educational domains in controversies over intelligent design -- eliding rather reconceiving MN. I argue against this pessimistic conclusion by showing: (1) empirical inquiry; (2) how it circumvents worries that a 'global' MN is indefensible as a prestipulated, inviolable norm (Ratzsch, 2004); and (3) why a 'global' MN stumbles more notably in some sciences rather than others (Bishop, 2009).Dr. Alan Love (Minnesota)
"Methodological Naturalism Reconceived (or Elided)"
Handouts from the event
Friday, April 13, 2012
Abstract: Whether or not "The Design Inference," by appealing to intelligent agency, violates a settled proscription of science does not settle the question of the arguement's strength. In this respect, worries about methodological naturalism are beside the point. Its proponents do, however, insist that ID offers strictly empirical grounds for belief in intelligent agency. In this talk, I argue that, at its heart, the inference depends crucially upon an evaluative judgement as to the goodness of certain states of affairs. This component is both necessary for the argument and beyond the ken of strict empiricism. Therefore, "Intelligent Design" is best understood as an example of the classic philosophical argument from teleology.Dr. Bob O'Connor (Wheaton)
"Design's Debt to Value"
Audio of the event
Friday, April 13, 2012
Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy, the Calvin Center for Christian Scholarship, and the Christian Perspectives in Science Seminar Series
[See the News and Events archive for past Philosophy lectures.]
Recent News
- Fall of 2011 Dr. Alvin Plantinga gave a lecture, "What is Christian Philosophy?" -- listen to that lecture online (.mp3 format) here.
- The Calvin College Undergraduate Philosophy Conference took place April 29-30. See photos of the event here.
- Read about the Third Annual Undergraduate Philosophy Conference as featured in Calvin News.
- Philosophers in Human Origins Seminars
(Click below to listen to audio recordings.)- Prof. Smith "Evolution and the Fall: Clarifying the Issues, Imagining the Possibilies."
- Prof. Clark "God, Chance, and Purpose"
[Check the News and Events archive.]
@JellemaRoom
on Facebook
