2012: Creating Character
According to virtue theorists, ethics is not simply a matter of being good rule-keepers. According to them, ethics is primarily about the formation of character. The primary question is not “What rules should I follow?” but “What sort of person should I be?” The typical answer is: A temperate, courageous, truthful, just, and self-controlled one. Such virtues are character traits; and although they do not precisely specify any actions, they are dispositions to feel and to act in certain ways in certain situations. When a just person is put in a situation that demands justice, she will act justly. And, in the proper situation, the temperate person will act temperately. Out of a good character will flow good and right actions, as well as appropriate feelings (for example, good will toward another person). Virtue is a strong, inner moral strength which helps people to respond appropriately to the challenges in life. Although virtue ethicists usually oppose rules ethics, they would not commend murder, say, or stealing. The virtuous person would have the kind of character so inclined toward the good and goods of other persons that she would not be disposed to take their life or property. Finally, a virtuous person is considered a fulfilled or flourishing human being while the vices—gluttony, for example, or sloth, anger and cowardice—dehumanize us. But what exactly are the virtues and why do they fulfill us (and vices frustrate us)? Is there an East-West rapprochement on the virtues and vices?

Our heart/minds have been shaped and prepared by evolution for pro-social behavior and feelings, and our nature has been shaped so that certain traits fulfill us while others frustrate us: evolution can be seen as developing human nature which virtue ethics will seek to fulfill. But can naturalistic evolution serve as the foundation of a virtue ethics? One compelling problem for an evolutionary virtue ethics is the lack of a telos or ideal in naturalistic evolution. We might find the “virtuous” life extending to one’s kin or polis but not out to the world; or we might favor those who can benefit us. Lacking a telos, we might not know which of our character traits are fulfilling and which are frustrating.

Character ethics also leads into the inescapably practical: how can we educate for character? Supposing we concur on a set of virtues, can virtue be taught? If so, how? Are there distinctly Eastern and Western approaches to the teaching of virtue? The Platonic and Confucian emphasis on character education has been lamentably lacking in contemporary philosophical discussion of ethics.

Seminar Directors: TBD
Location: TBD